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Abstract
EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the
control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429
on transmissible animal diseases (‘Animal Health Law’). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where
these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures
for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts
review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii)
the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zone, and the minimum length of time the
measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has
been published elsewhere; nonetheless, specific details of the model used for the assessment of the
laboratory sampling procedures for HPAI are presented here. Here, also, the transmission kernels used
for the assessment of the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones are shown. Several
scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the
start of the assessment. In summary, sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual for
HPAI were considered efficient for gallinaceous poultry, whereas additional sampling is advised for
Anseriformes. The monitoring period was assessed as effective, and it was demonstrated that the
surveillance zone comprises 95% of the infections from an affected establishment. Recommendations
provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of
further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to HPAI.
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Summary
This opinion is part of a series of opinions, in which the three-first terms of reference (ToR) of a
mandate received from the European Commission, have been considered. The background and specific
details of this mandate can be found in the opinion. The ToRs in this mandate request an assessment
of the effectiveness of:
• the clinical and laboratory examination in their capacity to detect disease (or estimate the
disease prevalence within an establishment), either in suspect or confirmed animals in a single
establishment or in establishments within restricted zones (ToR 1);
• the effectiveness of the duration of the monitoring period (for different scenarios) in the
control of suspected and confirmed outbreaks (ToR 2);
• the size and duration of the restriction zones, in their capacity for mitigating disease spread
(ToR 3).
In order to harmonise the approach to these assessments, the methodology used in this series of
opinions, covering all Category A diseases, was agreed on, and published in a separate technical report
(EFSA, 2020a,b).
A qualitative assessment of the clinical examination procedures for HPAI was carried out. For
assessing the effectiveness of the laboratory examination, a within flock compartmental model was
designed. Further, scripts were written that allowed the calculation of the median time (days) to
detection of a potential HPAI outbreak in a flock (and 95% prediction intervals), given that ‘standard
samples’, or other samples, were taken and tested using polymerase chain reaction (PCR). These
scripts were run separately for Galliformes and Anseriformes, assuming different transmission rates
and mean infectious periods, as well as different case fatality rates. The effectiveness of taking
standard samples (to be analysed by PCR) for early detection (within 10 days post-infection) was
assessed. For most scenarios tested, taking standard samples was sufficient to lead to the
confirmation of the infection. Nonetheless, in the event of a virus strain that causes low transmission
or low mortality, recommendations in terms of the most appropriate sampling strategy were given.
Recommendations for the use of serological sampling were also provided for some of the scenarios.
To answer ToR 2, and to assess the minimum length of time measures should be implemented in
the protection and surveillance zones (ToR 3.2), an extensive literature search (ELS) was carried out.
This ELS aimed to assess the average, shortest and longest period between the earliest point of
infection of a bird with a HPAI virus, and the time of reporting of a suspicion by the competent
authority. The average time to the reporting of a suspicion report was used then to assess the
effectiveness of the length monitoring period. For most of the scenarios, the existing length of the
monitoring period for HPAI (21 days) was considered sufficient; nonetheless, as clinical signs in
Anseriformes are not always obvious or present, this could result in longer periods to a suspicion
report (compared to chickens and other species in the Galliformes order). Some recommendations
were given in this respect for some of the relevant scenarios. To assess the effectiveness of the
minimum length of time, the measures should be applied in the protection and surveillance zones, the
average and the longest time assessed via the ELS were used, respectively. In this regard, the
minimum length of time the protection zone (21 days) and the surveillance zone (30 days) must be in
place for, when based on existing legislation, were considered effective.
To assess the effectiveness of the minimum radius to be implemented in the protection and
surveillance zones (ToR 3.1), transmission kernels were used. These kernels had been built using data
from previous outbreaks. These kernels represent the relative risk of transmission to each individual
establishment from the affected establishment. For HPAI, it was observed that, assuming transmission
from an affected establishment occurs, the probability of transmission beyond the protection zone was
0.52. Nonetheless, the probability of infection of an establishment located beyond 10 km (radius of the
restriction zone including protection and surveillance zones), drops greatly to 5%. As not all
establishments within the surveillance zone will be sampled, several recommendations were given in
terms of how to mitigate the risk of further spread within the surveillance zone. It is important to note
that the transmission kernels presented cover only some of the risk pathways associated with spread
of the index case and they do not take account wildlife contact, or movements of live animals and
products off the establishment prior to confirmation.
Control measures of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza





1.1. Background and Terms of Reference as provided by the requestor.................................................. 6
1.1.1. ToR 1: Sampling of animals and establishments for the detection of category A diseases in terrestrial
animals....................................................................................................................................... 6
1.1.2. ToR 2: Monitoring period ............................................................................................................. 7
1.1.3. ToR 3: Minimum radius of restricted zones and duration of the disease control measures in restricted
zones ......................................................................................................................................... 7
1.1.4. ToR 4: Prohibitions in restricted zones and risk-mitigating treatments for products of animal origin
and other materials ..................................................................................................................... 7
1.2. Interpretation of the Terms of Reference....................................................................................... 8
2. Epidemiology and geographical distribution of HPAI ....................................................................... 8
2.1. Epidemiology .............................................................................................................................. 8
2.2. Geographical distribution of the disease ........................................................................................ 10
3. Data and methodologies .............................................................................................................. 10
3.1. Methodology used in ToR 1.......................................................................................................... 10
3.2. Methodology used in ToR 2.......................................................................................................... 13
3.3. Methodology used in ToR 3.......................................................................................................... 13
3.4. Uncertainty ................................................................................................................................. 13
4. Assessment................................................................................................................................. 13
4.1. Assessment of sampling procedures.............................................................................................. 13
4.1.1. Assessment of sampling procedures in the event of suspicion or confirmation of Highly Pathogenic
Avian Influenza ........................................................................................................................... 13
4.1.1.1. In the event of a suspicion of HPAI in an establishment where animals of the listed species are kept 13
4.1.1.2. For the purposes of the epidemiological enquiry as referred to Article 57 of Regulation (EU)2016/429
in an HPAI officially confirmed establishment................................................................................. 17
4.1.1.3. For granting a specific derogation from killing animals of the categories of article 13.2 of the
Delegated Regulation in an HPAI affected establishment ................................................................ 18
4.1.1.4. For the animals of non-listed species kept in an HPAI affected establishment................................... 20
4.1.1.5. For wild animals of the listed species within the HPAI affected establishment and its surroundings.... 21
4.1.1.6. For animals of listed species in the non-affected establishments located in a protection zone............ 21
4.1.1.7. For non-affected establishments located in a surveillance zone ....................................................... 22
4.1.2. Assessment of sampling procedures to grant derogations for animal movements ............................. 23
4.1.2.1. From non-affected establishments located in the protection zone to slaughterhouses located within
the protection zone or in the surveillance zone or outside the restricted zone .................................. 23
4.1.2.2. For day-old-chicks (DOC) from a non-affected establishment located in the protection zone, hatched
from eggs originating in or outside the restricted zone to an establishment located in the same
Member State but if possible, outside the restricted zone ............................................................... 24
4.1.2.3. For ready-to-lay poultry from a non-affected establishment located in the protection zone to
establishments located in the same MS and if possible, within the restricted zone ............................ 25
4.1.2.4. From non-affected establishments located in the protection zone to a plant approved for processing
or disposal of animal by-products in which the animals are immediately killed.................................. 25
4.1.2.5. From an establishment in a surveillance zone to a slaughterhouse located within or outside the
restricted zone and from an establishment outside the surveillance zone to a slaughterhouse
situated in the surveillance zone................................................................................................... 26
4.1.2.6. For day-old-chicks from a non-affected establishment located in the surveillance zone, to an
establishment located in the same Member State where they were hatched .................................... 27
4.1.2.7. For ready-to-lay poultry located in the surveillance zone to establishments located in the same MS... 27
4.1.2.8. From an establishment located in the restricted zone to move within the restricted zone when
restriction measures are maintained beyond the period set out in Annex XI of the Delegated
Regulation .................................................................................................................................. 28
4.1.3. Assessment of sampling procedures for repopulation purposes ....................................................... 28
4.1.3.1. For the animals that are kept for the repopulation prior to their introduction ................................... 28
4.1.3.2. In the event of unusual mortalities or clinical signs being notified during the repopulation ................ 29
4.1.3.3. For repopulated animals .............................................................................................................. 30
4.2. Assessment of the length of the monitoring period for HPAI ........................................................... 30
4.2.1. Results ....................................................................................................................................... 31
4.2.2. Assessment................................................................................................................................. 33
Control measures of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 4 EFSA Journal 2021;19(1):6372
4.3. Assessment of the minimum radius and time periods of the protection and surveillance zones set in
place subsequent to a disease outbreak........................................................................................ 35
4.3.1. Assessment of the minimum radius............................................................................................... 35
4.3.2. Assessment of the minimum period .............................................................................................. 38
4.3.3. Uncertainty analysis..................................................................................................................... 38
5. Conclusions and Recommendations .............................................................................................. 38
References............................................................................................................................................... 49
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................... 51
Annex A – Definitions in EU legislation ....................................................................................................... 52
Annex B – Scenarios of ToR 1 ................................................................................................................... 54
Annex C – Sampling procedures for HPAI ................................................................................................... 61
Annex D – Scenarios of ToR 2 ................................................................................................................... 72
Annex E – Minimum radius and minimum period of duration of protection and surveillance zones according
to the legislation in place (Regulation (EU) 2016/429)................................................................................. 75
Annex F – Within-flock dynamics of HPAIV in Galliformes and Anseriformes .................................................. 76
Annex G – Uncertainty .............................................................................................................................. 78
Control measures of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 5 EFSA Journal 2021;19(1):6372
1. Introduction
1.1. Background and Terms of Reference as provided by the requestor
Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases (‘Animal Health Law’), hereinafter
referred to as AHL, requires the Commission to lay down detailed rules on the disease control
measures against listed diseases as referred to in point (a), (b) and (c) of its Article 9 (category A, B
and C diseases). The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts supplementing the rules laid
down in Part III of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases (Animal Health Law) on
disease control measures for listed diseases as referred to in point (a), (b) and (c) of its Article 9
(category A, B and C diseases). Therefore, the Commission has developed and adopted a Delegated
Regulation laying down rules for the prevention and control of certain diseases (‘the Delegated
Regulation’). The rules laid down in the Delegated Regulation are in respect of terrestrial animals
largely replicating the rules currently in force concerning the disease control measures in the event of
animal diseases with serious effects on the livestock as they have proven to be effective in preventing
the spread of those diseases within the Union. Consequently, many animal disease control measures
laid down in existing Directives will be, to the extent that not already done by the Animal Health Law,
replaced by the rules provided in the Delegated Regulation. At the same time, these rules have been
aligned with the international standards from the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE),
wherever these existed. However, certain disease control measures proposed in the Delegated
Regulation, in particular in its Annexes, were considered as outdated, i.e. possibly not based on most
recent scientific evidence at the time of development. Their review is considered as necessary.
Moreover, for those category A diseases for which rules were not established before or were not
detailed enough, certain disease control and risk mitigating measures are, due to the lack of scientific
basis, extrapolated from other diseases, for which rules existed in the past. Finally, for some other
diseases the evidence and scientific knowledge, was not available to the Commission and to the
Member States at the time of developing the Delegated Regulation due to the time constraints. The
following diseases are examples of the later: infection with Rift Valley fever (RVF), infection with
Mycoplasma mycoides subsp. mycoides SC (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia) (CBPP), Contagious
caprine pleuropneumonia (CCPP), Sheep pox and goat pox, infection with peste des petits ruminants
virus (PPR), African horse sickness (AHS), Glanders. In this regard, the existing rules will cease to
apply as from the date of application of the Animal Health Law and its complementing legislation
including the Delegated Regulation, i.e. from 21 April 2021. Certain of the proposed measures for the
prevention and control of category A diseases of terrestrial animals should therefore be assessed in
order to ensure that they are effective and updated based on the latest scientific knowledge in this
new set of legislation. This is particularly important in the case of those diseases that are less common
or have been never reported in the Union.
1.1.1. ToR 1: Sampling of animals and establishments for the detection of
category A diseases in terrestrial animals
Based on available scientific information, assess the effectiveness of existing sampling procedures
to detect or rule out the presence of each category A disease of terrestrial animals and, in case of
absence of effective procedures, develop them, in order to complete the rules provided for in Annex I
to the Delegated Regulation. In particular, provide for disease-specific procedures for the sampling of:
ToR 1.1 Animals for clinical examinations to ensure the detection of the relevant category A disease
during the performance of official investigations in establishments that are affected or suspected to be
affected by category A diseases and visits in establishments located in restricted zones in accordance
with Articles 6(2), 13(3)(c), 14(1) and 26(2) of the Delegated Regulation.
ToR 1.2 Animals for laboratory examinations to ensure the detection of the relevant category A
disease during the performance of official investigations in establishments that are affected or
suspected to be affected by category A diseases and visits in establishments located in restricted zones
in accordance with Articles 6(2), 12(3), 13(3)(c), 14(1), 26(2) of the Delegated Regulation.
ToR 1.3 Establishments to ensure the detection of the relevant category A disease for the
performance of visits in establishments located in protection zones larger than 3 km and
establishments located in the surveillance zone in accordance with Articles 26(5) and 41 of the
Delegated Regulation.
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ToR 1.4 Animals for clinical and laboratory examinations to ensure the detection of the relevant
category A disease for the movement of animals from restricted zones in accordance with Articles 28
(5), 43(5), 56(1)(c) of the Delegated Regulation.
ToR 1.5 Animals for laboratory examinations to ensure the detection of the relevant category A
disease before and after being introduced in the affected for repopulation, in accordance with Article
59(2), (3) and (9) of the Delegated Regulation.
1.1.2. ToR 2: Monitoring period
ToR 2.1 Assess the effectiveness of the length of the monitoring periods set out in Annex II of the
Delegated Regulation for each category A disease of terrestrial animals. In this regard, it is important
to take into consideration that the monitoring period was introduced as a management tool, which
represents a time frame of reference assigned to each category A disease for the competent authority
to apply certain control measures and to carry out investigations in the event of suspicion and
confirmation of category A diseases in terrestrial animals.
This assessment should be carried out with respect to the following situations:
a) the records analysis carried out by the competent authority in the framework of the
epidemiological enquiry referred to in Article 57 of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, in the event of
suspicion of a category A disease (Article 8(4) of the Delegated Regulation);
b) the derogation from killing in the event of an outbreak of a category A disease in
establishments keeping animals of listed species in two or more epidemiological units (Article
13(1) of the Delegated Regulation);
c) the tracing carried out by the competent authority to identify establishments and other
locations epidemiologically linked to an establishment affected by a category A disease (Article
17(2) of the Delegated Regulation);
d) the exemption applied to certain products from the prohibitions laid down in Annex VI taking
into account the date they were produced (Article 27(3)(c) of the Delegated Regulation);
e) the specific conditions for authorising movements of semen from approved germinal product
establishments in the protection and surveillance zones (Article 32(c) and 48(c) of the
Delegated Regulation);
f) the repopulation of establishments affected by a category A disease (Article 57(1)(b) and
59(4)(b) of the Delegated Regulation).
ToR 2.2 Propose the length of what should be the monitoring period in those diseases for which
the time is assessed as not effective.
1.1.3. ToR 3: Minimum radius of restricted zones and duration of the disease
control measures in restricted zones
ToR 3.1 Assess the effectiveness to control the spread of the disease of the minimum radius of the
protection and surveillance zones set out in Annex V of the Delegated Regulation for each category A
disease of terrestrial animals.
ToR 3.2 Assess the effectiveness to control the spread of the disease of the minimum periods
during which the competent authority should apply the restriction measures in the protection and
surveillance zones as set out in Annex X and XI for each category A disease of terrestrial animals.
1.1.4. ToR 4: Prohibitions in restricted zones and risk-mitigating treatments for
products of animal origin and other materials
ToR 4.1 Assess the effectiveness to control the spread of disease of prohibitions set out in Annex VI
of the Delegated Regulation with respect to the risk associated for each category A disease, to the
listed activities and commodities.
ToR 4.2 Review the available scientific information on risk-mitigating treatments that are effective to
control the presence of category A disease agents in products of animal origin and other relevant
materials. Based on this:
a) provide an opinion on the effectiveness of the risk-mitigating treatments for products of
animal origin and other materials produced or processed in the restricted zone set out in
Annex VII and VIII, and
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b) if relevant, suggest new treatments or procedures that can be effective to mitigate or to
eliminate such risk.
1.2. Interpretation of the Terms of Reference
To address the ToRs of this mandate, EFSA proposed and agreed with the European Commission
the following:
a) The publication of 14 individual opinions, one per each of the diseases included in the list of
category A diseases for terrestrial animals, with each of these opinions providing the answer
to ToRs 1, 2 and 3. This document is one of the 14 opinions covering ToRs 1, 2 and 3 for
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI).
b) The publication of a unique opinion covering ToR 4 for all diseases listed (i.e. ToR 4 is not
covered in this opinion).
c) To address ToR 1 (effectiveness of sampling procedures), EFSA agreed with the European
Commission on 21 scenarios (based on different articles of the Delegated Act) for which the
effectiveness of the sampling procedures will be assessed (Annex B). Although these
scenarios will be assessed independently, some of them may be merged if the assessment
results are the same.
d) To address ToR 2 (effectiveness of the monitoring period), seven scenarios previously agreed
with the requestor were defined (Annex D). The assessment of the effectiveness of the
monitoring period will be performed by assessing its ability to ensure that specific actions can
be carried out without posing a risk of disease spread, if the monitoring period is calculated
backward or forward from a specific date. If the length of the monitoring period as evaluated
by EFSA is longer than the existing monitoring periods, the existing monitoring period will be
considered non-effective. If the length of the monitoring period estimated by EFSA is shorter
than the existing monitoring period, this existing monitoring period will be considered effective
from a disease control point of view. No assessment of the plausible unnecessary economic
burden that may be placed on the stakeholders as a result of an excessive length of the
monitoring periods will be done by EFSA.
e) The assessment of the minimum duration and the length of the radius of the protection and
surveillance zones (ToR 3) will be done independently. The setting of these two zones
surrounding an affected establishment, and the control measures implemented in each one of
the zones are based on the general principle that the probability of disease spread is larger
the closer the establishment is to an affected establishment. The validity of this statement will
not be assessed in this manuscript (e.g. transmission by wild birds will not follow this
principle); nonetheless, the limitations that this assumption may have in the control of certain
diseases will, when relevant, be discussed.
f) The following scenarios in ToR 1 (Annex B) were not relevant for HPAI, and therefore were
not included in the assessment: a) scenario 7 because the minimum radius of the protection
zone for HPAI is 3 km, and b) scenarios 14 and 15 as they refer to ungulates.
g) The duration of the monitoring period for HPAI as described in Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation is 21 days.
h) The minimum length of the radius of the protection zone (PZ) and surveillance zone (SZ) for
HPAI as described in Annex V of the Delegated regulation are 3 and 10 km, respectively.
i) The minimum duration of the measures in the PZ and SZ for HPAI as described in Annex X
and XI of the Delegated Regulation is 21 and 30 days, respectively.
2. Epidemiology and geographical distribution of HPAI
2.1. Epidemiology
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), also called ‘fowl plague’, is a contagious, multi-organ
systemic viral disease of poultry, in contrast to low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) causing only mild
or subclinical disease. HPAI is caused by infection with virulent strains of Type A influenza virus,
belonging to the Orthomyxoviridae family, genus Alphainfluenzavirus (Swayne and Suarez, 2000). All
HPAI virus strains belong to the H5 or H7 subtype (Spickler, 2015).
Avian influenza is a notifiable disease, with monitoring and surveillance being essential to quickly
contain emerging outbreaks and reduce the risk of zoonotic transmission (Spickler, 2015). Aquatic
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migratory birds, mostly within the orders of Anseriformes and Charadriiformes, are regarded as the
reservoir for all genes associated with Influenza A viruses (USAHA 2008; Brouwer, et al., 2019).
Although the involvement of wild birds in outbreaks is often difficult to prove, it is highly likely that
domesticated poultry is infected through exposure to the faeces of wild birds (Richard et al., 2017).
Other common sources of infection are both via the introduction of infected domestic poultry to a farm
(followed by contamination through the faecal-oral route or by aerosol), and through the infection of
domestic birds by contaminated fomites (Spickler, 2015). Airborne transmission between poultry farms
is also likely in poultry-dense regions (Ypma et al., 2013). Existing national and international
surveillance programmes consist of virological passive detection in dead birds, as well as active
surveillance in living and hunted birds. In wild birds, both passive and active surveillance use PCR
detection methods. In domestic birds, passive surveillance is used to detect all H5 and H7 subtypes,
and is most effective at detecting HPAI, while active surveillance refers to the serological testing aimed
mainly at LPAI detection (Brouwer et al., 2019).
HPAI can spread rapidly, causing severe disease and death in poultry species such as chicken,
turkey, quail, guinea fowl, domestic duck as well as in wild birds species, and pet birds (OIE 2020). In
a recent global seasonality analysis, it was shown how HPAI outbreaks in poultry peak in February and
are lowest in September (Awada et al., 2018). Notably, Anseriformes, such as the Pekin duck, do not
always exhibit severe clinical disease when infected with some HPAI strains (OIE 2019). Humans and
other mammals (e.g. cats, pigs, ferrets) are occasionally cross-infected following close contact with,
manipulation or ingestion of infected birds, as was observed in the past outbreaks of H5N1, H7N9 and
H7N7 (Koopmans et al., 2004; Poovorawan et al., 2013).
Once infected, the incubation period for Influenza A in poultry species is between 1 and 7 days for
an individual, and up to 21 days for a flock (USAHA, 2008). Symptoms of HPAI include coughing,
sneezing, sinusitis, blood-tinged oral and nasal discharges, loss of feathers, diarrhoea, depression,
inappetence and sudden death. Furthermore, egg production stops or decreases, producing deformed
or shell-less eggs (Spickler, 2015). Necropsy findings include haemorrhages and necrosis of the
respiratory and gastro-intestinal organs. Chicken and turkey species are most susceptible, with
mortality rates being as high as 90–100% within 2–12 days after the first signs of illness. The
differentiation between high and low pathogenicity is based on the mortality and severity of the
disease in chickens; clinical manifestation and mortality in Anseriformes species, such as domestic
ducks and geese, can vary depending on the virus strain, host species and the level of viral exposure,
going from mild without mortality, to very severe with high mortality (USAHA, 2008; OIE, 2019; EFSA,
2020b; Swayne et al., 2020).
Diagnostic samples, collected by oropharyngeal and cloacal/faecal swabs from live birds and faecal
or organ samples from dead birds, are tested using direct molecular techniques (real-time reverse
transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) (OIE 2019). For viral isolation (used as the reference
standard), samples are inoculated and incubated in embryonated eggs, which are then tested for the
presence of virus using RT-PCR, agar gel immunodiffusion (AGID), antigen-detection enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assays (ELISAs), or other immunoassays. To distinguish between LPAI and HPAI
viruses, genetic tests to detect patterns in the haemagglutinin (HA) and/or virulence tests are used
(Intravenous Pathogenicity Index, IVPI). While antigen testing can produce results in as little as
15 min, the current recommendation by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) is that it
should only be used to interpret the presence of influenza A at flock level and not for diagnosis in
individual birds (OIE, 2020). Furthermore, future antigen tests should be species-specific and validated
accordingly, as the most common test for chickens and turkey is not as sensitive in detecting disease
in other avian species (Spickler, 2015).
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2.2. Geographical distribution of the disease
Using data from ADNS and OIE, Figure 1 above shows in a colour-coded manner the countries
were HPAI outbreaks in poultry, and detections in wild birds, were worldwide reported between 2015
and 2020.
3. Data and methodologies
Although the general methodology applied to all opinions covering the assessment of control
measures for the Category A diseases produced under this mandate has been published elsewhere
(EFSA, 2020a), specific details of the methodology related to the HPAI opinion are presented below.
3.1. Methodology used in ToR 1
In order to assess in a quantitative manner, the effectiveness of the laboratory sampling procedures
for HPAI (i.e. sample sizes described in existing legislation and presented in Annex C), a mathematical
model for HPAI virus transmission was developed. The specifications of the model are described below
together with the different transmission scenarios that were considered, and the parameters used. The
model predictions for both, gallinaceous1 poultry (Figure F.1), and for Anseriformes (Figure F.2), are
shown in Annex F.
The number of birds in the different model compartments (susceptible, exposed, infectious,
recovered and dead) resulting from this modelling exercise was used to estimate the number of birds
in the different disease states over time (Table 1). The probability of detection, pD, given a specific
sample size was then computed using the hypergeometric distribution (assuming sampling without
replacement), so that
Figure 1: Map of countries where outbreaks of HPAI were reported in wild birds and/or poultry
between 2015 and 2020 (Data sources: ADNS and OIE)
1 This term refers to the Galliformes order. This order includes turkey, grouse, chicken, New World quail and Old World quail,
ptarmigan, partridge, pheasant, guineafowl, francolin, junglefowl, peafowl and the Cracidae.
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where M is the total number of dead, sick or healthy birds, K is the number of dead, sick or healthy
birds that are infected (and detectable) and SS is the number of dead, sick or healthy birds sampled.
The relationship between M and K and the model variables is given in Table 1, where mB is the
baseline mortality (proportion of birds dying each day due to reasons other than HPAI), mB is the
baseline morbidity (proportion of birds showing signs consistent with HPAI) and mI is the proportion of
infectious birds showing signs of HPAI. In this table, S, E, I, R and D are used to represent birds that
are susceptible (i.e. uninfected), exposed (i.e. infected but not infectious), infectious (i.e. infected and
infectious), recovered and dead (i.e. birds that have died due to HPAI, and so would be PCR positive),
respectively.
Baseline morbidity and mortality were assumed to be 1% and 0.1%, respectively (van Niekerk
et al., 2012; Gonzales and Elbers, 2018).2 For gallinaceous poultry, all infectious birds were assumed to
show clinical signs. For Anseriformes, infectious birds were assumed to show clinical signs at baseline
levels (i.e. 1%) in the no mortality scenarios, 10% of infectious birds were assumed to show clinical
signs in the low mortality scenarios, while all (i.e. 100%) of infectious birds were assumed to show
clinical signs in the high mortality scenarios. Birds were assumed to be tested by PCR, and a sensitivity
and specificity of 100% was assumed.
Mathematical model and transmission scenarios considered
The within-flock dynamics of HPAI virus were modelled using a stochastic compartmental model
(Keeling and Rohani, 2008). For gallinaceous poultry, the host population is divided into three classes:
susceptible (i.e. uninfected), S; exposed (i.e. infected, but not yet infectious), E; and infectious (i.e.
infected and infectious), I. All birds were assumed to die at the end of their infectious period. For
Anseriformes, the host population is divided into four classes: susceptible (i.e. uninfected), S; exposed
(i.e. infected, but not yet infectious), E; infectious, I; and recovered, R. Disease-associated mortality
was assumed to occur at a constant rate during the infectious period.
The force of infection is given by,
kðtÞ ¼ b I(t)
N(t)
where b is the transmission rate, I(t) is the number of infectious birds and N(t) is the total number of
birds at time t. This formulation assumes homogeneous mixing (i.e. individuals uniformly and randomly
contact each other) and frequency-dependent transmission (i.e. the number of contacts is independent
of the population size) (Keeling and Rohani, 2008). The durations of the latent (time between infection
by HPAI and the birds becoming infectious) and infectious periods were assumed to follow gamma
distributions with means lE and lI and shape parameters kE and kI, respectively (i.e. with variances
lE
2/kE and lI
2/kI). This was incorporated in the model by subdividing the latent and infectious classes
into kE and kI stages each of mean duration lE/kE and lI/kI, respectively (Anderson and Watson,
1980).
The number of birds in each class in the model takes integer values, while transitions between
compartments are stochastic processes. The number of transitions of each type during a small-time
Table 1: Relationship between numbers of dead, sick and healthy birds and model variables, and




Total number of dead (M)




Dead birds mB(S(t) + E(t) + I(t) + R(t)) + D(t) mB(E(t) + I(t)) + D(t) 5
Sick birds mB(S(t) + E(t) + R(t)) + mII(t) mBE(t) + mII(t) 20
Healthy birds (1–mB)(S(t) + E(t) + R(t)) + (1–mI)I(t) (1–mB)E(t) + (1–mI)I(t) 60
2 Conservative estimates were selected.
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interval dt was drawn from a binomial distribution with the number of birds in the appropriate class
n and transition probability q (the appropriate per capita rate multiplied by dt) as parameters.
The initial flock size was assumed to be 10,000 birds for both gallinaceous poultry and
Anseriformes. Parameter estimates are given in Table 2 for gallinaceous poultry and Table 3 for
Anseriformes.
For gallinaceous poultry, the minimum, median and maximum transmission rates were obtained
from a review and reanalysis of published transmission experiments (CVI and APHA, 2017). In the
same transmission experiments, the mean infectious periods could be categorised as short (around
2 days) or long (around 6 days) (CVI and APHA, 2017), and the median for the experiments in the
short and long categories was used in the scenarios. Thus, a total of six scenarios were considered for
gallinaceous poultry.
For Anseriformes, there were two scenarios for the transmission rate and mean infectious period
(CVI and APHA, 2017) and three scenarios for case fatality: none (0%), low (5%) or high (50%) to
reflect the variability in manifestation (Swayne et al., 2020). Thus, six scenarios were considered for
Anseriformes.
For gallinaceous poultry and Anseriformes, the mean latent period and the shape parameters for
the latent and infectious periods were extracted from the published literature and were common to all
scenarios.
Table 2: Parameters in the model for the transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in
gallinaceous poultry
Scenario b lE kE lI kI
Low transmission, short infectious period 0.76 0.24** 2** 1.65 5**
Medium transmission, short infectious period 1.43 1.65
High transmission, short infectious period 4.50 1.65
Low transmission, long infectious period 0.76 6.30
Medium transmission, long infectious period 1.43 6.30
High transmission, long infectious period 4.50 6.30
**: Estimated by Bouma et al. (2009), see scenario B from their Table 4.
b – transmission rate.
lE – mean latent period.
kE – shape parameter for gamma-distributed latent period.
lI – mean infectious period.
kI – shape parameter for gamma-distributed infectious period.
Table 3: Parameters in the model for the transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in
Anseriformes
Scenario b lE kE lI kI Case fatality
No mortality, transmission 1 1.6 1.0† 2‡ 13.4 2‡ 0
No mortality, transmission 2 4.7 4.3 0
Low mortality, transmission 1 1.6 13.4 0.05
Low mortality, transmission 2 4.7 4.3 0.05
High mortality, transmission 1 1.6 13.4 0.5
High mortality, transmission 2 4.7 4.3 0.5
†: Assumed by van der Goot et al. (2008) when analysing their data.
‡: Assumed value.
b – transmission rate.
lE – mean latent period.
kE – shape parameter for gamma-distributed latent period.
lI – mean infectious period.
kI – shape parameter for gamma-distributed infectious period.
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3.2. Methodology used in ToR 2
To answer ToR 2, an extensive literature search (ELS) was outsourced by EFSA (OC/EFSA/ALPHA/
2020/02 – LOT 2).3 The aim of this ELS was to answer the epidemiological question: ‘what is the
average, shortest and longest period of time (measured as the number of days from the earliest point
of infection with HPAI virus (HPAIV), to the time of declaration of a suspicion by the competent
authority after the clinical investigation by an official veterinarian) for an outbreak of HPAI to be
reported?’. To answer this question, an ELS on case reports, papers describing outbreaks or epidemics
of HPAI, and any other relevant grey literature or data, was carried out. For the inclusion criteria in the
ELS, the earliest point of infection had to have been estimated by carrying out an epidemiological
investigation. Papers and other sources of data where the earliest point of infection was determined
purely by subtracting a known incubation period from the date of the suspicion of the outbreak were
excluded. The ELS was restricted to studies conducted in Europe or describing results obtained in
Europe. If none or very few articles were retrieved (less or equal to 5) in the first search, the search
was extended to the rest of the world. The general protocol used for the ELS is shown in Annex 5 of
the Methodology report (EFSA, 2020a).
3.3. Methodology used in ToR 3
Methodology for assessing the effectiveness of the minimum radius of the protection and
surveillance zones
Studies investigating the transmission of HPAI virus between farms using transmission kernels were
identified in the published literature. The functional form, parameter estimates and the 95%
confidence or credible intervals for the parameters (where provided) of the best-fitting kernels were
extracted from each study.
For each kernel, the probability of transmission beyond given distances (if transmission were to
occur from an infected establishment) was computed using the estimates and the lower and upper
95% confidence limits for the parameters. In addition, the distances at which a threshold probability of
transmission beyond that distance is reached were also calculated for each kernel using the estimates,
along with its lower and upper 95% confidence limits.
Methodology for assessing the effectiveness of the duration of the protection and
surveillance zones
To estimate the duration of measures in the protection and surveillance zones, the outputs
obtained from the ELS described in Section 3.2 were used. Further details can be found in the
Methodology report (EFSA, 2020a).
3.4. Uncertainty
A description of the methodology followed to deal with uncertainty is provided in a Methodology
report published by EFSA (EFSA, 2020a).
4. Assessment
4.1. Assessment of sampling procedures
4.1.1. Assessment of sampling procedures in the event of suspicion or
confirmation of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
4.1.1.1. In the event of a suspicion of HPAI in an establishment where animals of the
listed species are kept
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures of
animals of listed species in a suspected establishment, based on clinical examination (TOR 1.1) and
laboratory examination (TOR 1.2), in their ability to detect HPAI in kept animals if the disease is
present in that establishment, or to rule it out if not present (Art. 6 (2)).
3 https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-display.html?cftId=6249
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Summary of sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
A diagnostic manual for Avian Influenza is set out in the Annex of Commission Decision 2006/437/EC4
(hereinafter referred to as ‘diagnostic manual’); here, the clinical and laboratory guidelines for HPAI are
described in detail. A summary of the guidelines for the different scenarios to be assessed, are shown in
Annex C of this opinion.
In the diagnostic manual, it is recommended that, in the case of a suspicion of HPAI, production
and health records (daily mortality, egg production and feed and/or water intake) are verified by the
official veterinarian at arrival to the suspect establishment, with the records going back one week
before the commencement of clinical signs. The inspection of these records is part of the
epidemiological investigation that the official veterinarian must carry out in a suspect establishment in
order to identify the most likely point of entry in time, plausible epidemiological links, etc. (this point
will be discussed further in the assessment of ToR 2). Aside, the inspection of the production and
health records is recommended in order to identify flocks (or other form of larger or smaller
epidemiological units) where further clinical inspection should be prioritised, and where samples may
be taken.
The official inspection should also include a clinical inspection of each production unit with a clinical
examination of poultry or other captive birds, in particular those that appear sick. The main clinical
signs are variable depending on the virulence of the virus, the species and other epidemiological
factors. Detailed description of the clinical signs as well as post-mortem lesions observed in the
different species is also presented in the diagnostic manual. As described in this manual, unless the
competent authority is satisfied that a suspected outbreak may be excluded on the basis of the clinical
inspection, the ‘standard samples’ must be taken from each production unit. The number of samples
to be taken in what it is denominated as ‘standard samples’ is described below. Subsequent to
receiving the results from the laboratory examination, and independently of the results, a final clinical
inspection of the poultry must be carried out prior to the lifting of the official surveillance.
The standard samples to be taken are:
For virological testing:
Any flock showing clinical signs must be targeted with at least five sick/dead birds and/or at least
20 tracheal/oropharyngeal and 20 cloacal swabs (or from all birds if less than 20 birds are present)
taken from these birds.
For serological testing:
Birds appearing sick or that have apparently recovered must be targeted with at least 20 blood
samples (or from all birds if less than 20 birds are present) being taken.
• 1st Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.1 and ToR 1.2 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 6(2) of the Delegated Regulation
• Commission Implemented Regulation 2018/1882 on listed species
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration during for the assessment (further
details are shown in Annex B):
1) It concerns an event of suspicion of HPAI in an establishment of kept animals of the listed species
2) The listed species for HPAI, as provided in Commission Implemented Regulation 2018/1882, are
species of the Class Aves
3) In the event of a suspicion of HPAI, the competent authority shall immediately conduct an investigation
to confirm or rule out the presence of the disease
During the visit, the official veterinarian must perform clinical examinations and collect samples for laboratory
examinations.
4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006D0437&from=EN
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Assessment
The existing diagnostic manual for avian influenza is very comprehensive, with very precise details
on how the clinical and laboratory examinations for HPAI should be carried out. In terms of the
guidelines for clinical examination, and although already mentioned in the diagnostic manual, it is
deemed primordial that the clinical inspection is carried out in the full establishment, and not just in
some flocks or production units. A clinical inspection of the entire establishment should lead to the
selection of birds (dead or sick) for further examination and/or laboratory sampling.
In the diagnostic manual, samples from dead birds, or birds showing clinical signs should be taken,
and sent for laboratory analysis. According to Gonzales and Elbers (2018), and Schreuder et al.
(2020), mortality is the most sensitive parameter for early detection of HPAI in chicken flocks. In the
latter publication, it is suggested that an increased mortality ratio may be the most objective
parameter to detect HPAI infection at an early stage on both chicken, and Pekin duck establishments;
nonetheless, observation of clinical signs may influence sometimes the early notification of a suspicion.
Using the methodology described in Section 3.1, the number of days (median and 95% prediction
interval) from the introduction to the detection of HPAI with a 95% confidence was calculated when a
specific set of samples (i.e. samples from 5 dead birds, 20 sick birds, and 60 healthy birds) was
submitted for laboratory analysis (under different transmission scenarios assumptions). The model
predictions are also shown in Annex F.
The results are shown below in Tables 4 and 5 for Galliformes and Anseriformes transmission
scenarios, respectively. A figure showing the probability of detection in Galliformes and Anseriformes
for the different transmission scenarios is also shown below (Figure 2).
Table 4: Median (95% prediction interval) time (days post introduction) to 95% confidence for
detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in gallinaceous poultry
Scenario
Sample size for laboratory examination
5 dead birds 20 sick birds 60 healthy birds
Low transmission, short infectious period 6 (3, 13) 9 (3, 27) 43 (33, 62)
Medium transmission, short infectious period 4 (3, 6) 4 (2, 6) 10 (8, 12)
High transmission, short infectious period 3 (2, 3) 2 (1,2) 3 (3, 4)
Low transmission, long infectious period 9 (6, 14) 5 (3, 10) 14 (12, 19)
Medium transmission, long infectious period 7 (5, 9) 3 (2, 5) 8 (6, 10)
High transmission, long infectious period 4 (3, 4) 2 (1, 3) 3 (3, 4)
Table 5: Median (95% prediction interval) time (days post introduction) to 95% confidence for
detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in Anseriformes
Scenario*
Sample
5 dead birds 20 sick birds 60 healthy birds
No mortality, transmission 1 11 (10, 12) 10 (8, 11) 8 (7, 10)
No mortality, transmission 2 6 (5, 7) 5 (5, 7) 5 (4, 6)
Low mortality, transmission 1 10 (8, 12) 7 (6, 10) 8 (7, 11)
Low mortality, transmission 2 5 (4,7) 4 (2, 5) 5 (4, 6)
High mortality, transmission 1 8 (6, 11) 5 (3, 8) 10 (8, 13)
High mortality, transmission 2 4 (3, 6) 3 (2, 5) 5 (4, 7)
*: Transmission 1: low transmission, long infectious period (IP); transmission 2: high transmission, short IP.
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Table 4 shows the median time to detection of HPAI in Gallinaceous poultry. The table shows that
testing 5 dead birds or swabs from 20 sick birds would result in median times between virus
introduction to detection ranging from 3 to 9 days, indicating that collecting and testing these samples
on those days would result in the HPAI diagnosis 95 out of 100 times. The upper limits of the 95%
prediction intervals are 10 days or lower for all but the scenarios with the low transmission rate
(scenarios 1 and 4). In those scenarios, the upper limit could be up to 14 days when testing 5 dead
birds, or 27 days when testing swabs of 20 sick birds. However, the combination of testing 5 dead
birds and 20 tracheal/oropharyngeal and 20 cloacal swabs would result in an increase of the detection
probabilities, and a decrease in the time to detection. Table 5 shows the results obtained for the
different transmission scenarios considered for Anseriformes. In this case, if virus strains are associated
with clinical disease and mortality, testing 5 dead birds, or samples of 20 sick birds result in a median
time between introduction and 95% probability of detection of 4–10, and 3–7 days, respectively.
Among all scenarios considered for Anseriformes, the upper limits of the 95% prediction intervals are
10 and 12 days, respectively. The median time is generally shorter when collecting 20 samples from
sick birds than when collecting 5 dead birds, the reasons being the higher sample size (5 vs 20), the
higher case morbidity compared to the case fatality and the longer infectious period/generation time.
Remarkably, for the scenarios in this table where we assume no case morbidity and case fatality (two-
first scenarios in Table 5), where only background mortality and morbidity are considered, 60 healthy
birds have a comparable sensitivity to testing 5 dead birds or 20 sick birds in the scenarios 3–6, with
median detection times of 8 and 5 days (60 birds). However, unlike the other scenarios, in the absence
of a clinical manifestation and disease associated mortality, there is no information on the onset of the
disease, so it is unknown at what stage of the disease the samples are collected. In that case
serological testing has added value, although outbreaks will be detected by the serological testing at a
late stage, due to the time between infection and seroconversion. The required sample size detects
Figure 2: Probability of detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in gallinaceous poultry
(left column) or Anseriformes (right column). Plots show the median probability of detection
for different scenarios. For gallinaceous poultry, scenarios are short (solid lines) or long
(dashed lines) infectious periods and low (red), median (blue) or high (magenta)
transmission rates (see Table 2 in Section 3.1). For Anseriformes, scenarios are no (red),
low (blue) or high (magenta) mortality with different transmission rates/infectious periods
(solid or dashed lines) (see Table 3 in Section 3.1)
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15% seroprevalence with 95% confidence, which is sufficient to detect a major outbreak at the level
of a production unit (flock). Nonetheless, serological testing would not be of use in terms of detecting
HPAI in gallinaceous poultry, as most of the flock will have died before seroconversion takes place. In
both Anseriformes and Galliformes, confirmation should always be based on the identification of the
virus, and not antibodies.
Development of new procedures
In summary, the sample sizes of 5 dead birds or samples of 20 sick birds for HPAI investigation are
sufficient to detect HPAI in gallinaceous poultry, because outbreaks are generally detectable within
10 days after introduction (see Section 4.2). A combination of 5 dead birds and 20 sick birds is
recommended to prevent relatively late detection that could occur when dealing with a strain with a
low transmission rate parameter. In case we are dealing with a virus strain that is associated with
clinical disease in Anseriformes, sampling five dead birds, or 20 sick birds are also sufficient, although
testing 20 sick birds would achieve an earlier detection compared to testing five dead birds. In case of
a virus that does not induce mortality, or clear clinical signs, testing 60 healthy birds, either swabs for
PCR or blood samples for serology (assuming 100% sensitivity of the serological test), per production
unit is recommended. Serological testing of gallinaceous poultry can be omitted.
4.1.1.2. For the purposes of the epidemiological enquiry as referred to Article 57 of
Regulation (EU)2016/429 in an HPAI officially confirmed establishment
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures,
based on laboratory examination (ToR 1.2), in their ability to detect the disease in the event of
preventive killing, and in their ability to support with the epidemiological investigation (disease
detection, prevalence estimation, virus identification, etc.) in kept animals of listed species in an
affected establishment, before or when they are killed or found dead. The purposes of the
epidemiological enquiry are described in Article 57 of Regulation (EU)2016/429. See Annex B.
Summary of the laboratory sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
No clinical examination is required, standard samples (5 dead birds and/or swabs from 20 sick
birds) must be taken according to the guidelines presented in the diagnostic manual for HPAI in each
production unit.
Assessment
Standard sampling is of limited use to address the objectives of this scenario (other than in the
event of preventive killing) as the farm has been confirmed using the standard sampling; it is therefore
• 2nd Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.2 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 12(3) and the Art. 7 (4) (Preventive killing) of the Delegated Regulation
• Article 57 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/429
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration during for the assessment:
1) It concerns to the sampling carried out in a HPAI confirmed establishment (Art. 12(3)), or to a suspect
establishment where preventive killing is carried out (Art. 7(4))
2) It refers to kept animals of listed species found dead or when they are being killed
3) The competent authority must collect samples for laboratory examination
4) The purposes of the sampling are:
a) supporting the epidemiological enquiry to:
i) identify the likely origin of the disease;
ii) calculate the likely length of time that the disease is present;
iii) identify establishments where the animals could have contracted the disease and movements from
the affected establishment that could have led to the spread of the disease; and
iv) obtain information on the likely spread of the listed disease in the surrounding environment,
including the presence and distribution of disease vectors
5) confirming/ruling out disease in the event of preventive killing.
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unclear how any additional sampling on the same farm would help with the epidemiological
investigation. This sampling is, however, useful to establish how widespread the infection is across the
farm in case of multiple production units. In that case the assessment of Section 4.1.1.1 applies.
Similarly, in the event of preventive killing, the assessment for Section 4.1.1.1 should apply.
Development of new procedures
Information should be gathered during the epidemiological investigation of the affected
establishment regarding contacts with other farms in order to establish the most likely source of
introduction, and its spread to other farms. For that purpose, whole genome sequencing (WGS) is
important to link outbreaks, and the officially collected samples can be used for that purpose.
Additional sampling in production units previously not sampled may contribute to establish the extent
of spread on the farm. Sampling in each production unit should be carried out as advocated in
Section 4.1.1.1. To establish the length of the infectious period in gallinaceous poultry, the temporal
pattern of daily mortality prior to detection can be used to estimate the most likely time window of
introduction (Bos et al., 2007). In the future, it may be useful to have samples of dead birds across
the establishment/flock for WGS as the genetic variation of the viruses, in combination with molecular
clock, may help estimating the introduction time. Blood samples for serology are useful in production
units without apparent signs of the infection, as this may help differentiate between a primary
incursion of HPAI (e.g. from wild birds) and a mutation from LPAI to HPAI. In the latter case,
seropositive birds might be detected. Twenty samples per production unit allows for detection of a
15% seroprevalence with 95% confidence (RiBESS+ tool5 was used for this calculation).
In Anseriformes, mortality will only be a good indicator in case we are dealing with a strain
associated with a high case fatality rate (Schreuder et al., 2020). Given that it takes 2 weeks for an
animal to seroconvert, and some extra days (depending on the infection rate parameter) for the
infection to spread across the flock, estimating the seroprevalence in such a farm would provide
helpful information to test the length of the infectious period. For example, assuming a 50% a priori
seroprevalence, taking 43 samples in production units of the affected epidemiological unit would be
enough to estimate the prevalence with a 10% precision and 95% confidence (RiBESS+ tool5 was used
for this calculation).
4.1.1.3. For granting a specific derogation from killing animals of the categories of article
13.2 of the Delegated Regulation in an HPAI affected establishment
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of listed species
belonging to the categories described in article 13(2) of an affected establishment, in order to grant a
specific derogation from killing these animals, while ensuring that they do not pose a risk for the
transmission of the disease.
5 https://efsa.openanalytics.eu/app/ribess
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Summary of sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
Twenty-one days after the last finding of HPAI, a clinical inspection and examination must be
performed, and samples for laboratory testing must be taken from each production unit. Samples
include any dead poultry or other captive birds present at the time of sampling and, where practical,
tracheal/oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs from at least 60 poultry or other captive birds or from all
such poultry or other captive birds where less than 60 are present on the holding; or, if the birds are
small, exotic and not used to being handled or handling them would be dangerous for people, samples
of fresh faeces must be collected. Derogations for sampling may be granted based on the risk
assessment. The sampling and laboratory testing of such samples must continue until two consecutive
negative laboratory results are obtained which must be at least 21 days apart.
Assessment
Given that a HPAI outbreak is usually associated with increased mortality, collecting and testing
samples of any dead poultry or captive bird is appropriate. This will most likely be sufficient for
gallinaceous poultry (see Section 4.1.1.1), but for many other species, the case fatality rate of HPAI
might be quite low. Consequently, additional testing is useful in these instances.
The current procedure aims at detecting a 5% prevalence with 95% confidence. There is no
information available to know whether the prevalence of virus positive birds will exceed the 5% level
at the establishment level, should infection and transmission occur. The population dynamics of the
infection are unknown in most captive birds and in particular when the HPAI infection behaves like an
LPAI infection and there is no random mixing of the birds, as a result the testing of swabs for viral
RNA may be insufficient. Serology could add in confidence of freedom in those cases, which is also
increased by requiring two subsequent negative tests with 21 days interval as the diagnostic manual
establishes.
Development of new procedures
It is recommended to maintain the current procedure, although serological testing could be added
when possible.
• 3rd Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.1 and ToR 1.2 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 13(3)c of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns an affected establishment where infection is officially confirmed
2) In the establishment there are kept animals of listed species of the following specific categories animal
categories based on article 13(2):
a) animals kept in a confined establishment
b) animals kept for scientific purposes or purposes related to conservation of protected or endangered
species
c) animals officially registered in advance as rare breeds
d) animals with a duly justified high genetic, cultural or educational value
3) the competent authority may grant specific derogation from killing all the animals of listed species
belonging to any of the above categories in an affected establishment, provided that specific conditions
are fulfilled
4) The animals should be subjected to clinical surveillance, including laboratory examinations
5) Sampling procedures should ensure that the animals do not pose a risk of transmission of the category A
disease if left alive
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4.1.1.4. For the animals of non-listed species kept in an HPAI affected establishment
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures,
based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of non-listed species
kept in an affected establishment, in their ability to ensure the detection of the virus if the virus is
present in these species.
Summary of sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
This scenario is in particular targeted at pigs, because they are considered the domesticated
mammalian host most likely to become infected by an avian influenza virus. Moreover, reassortment with
swine influenza viruses could take place (Bourret, 2018). The guidelines prescribe an inspection of the
production records and clinical inspection of the animals on the establishments. Given the similarities of
avian influenza viruses to swine influenza viruses, respiratory problems and fever are the most likely
signs, should the infection be clinically manifest. For sampling, it is prescribed that 60 pigs are tested for
presence of the virus, and at least 60 blood samples must be collected from the pigs for serology, 2–4
weeks from the date of culling. Similar procedures are described for the movement of pigs.
Where the official veterinarian has a suspicion that other domestic mammals on the holdings, in
particular those with identified susceptibility to infection with avian influenza viruses of H5 and H7
subtypes, may have been in contact with the infected poultry or other captive birds (or the products
thereof), samples for laboratory tests must be taken. Of the other common species, equines and
minks are also relevant (Parrish et al., 2015; Short et al., 2015). Given observations that cats may be
infected with H5N1 avian influenza virus and can transmit it to other cats experimentally (Harder and
Vahlenkamp, 2010), sampling dead cats is also prescribed.
Assessment
The current procedure aims at detecting a 5% prevalence with 95% confidence. There is no
information available to assess whether a 5% prevalence of virus positive pigs will be reached should
infection and transmission occur, as the population dynamics of the infection in pigs are unknown (as it
is an avian strain and not swine influenza). However, the serological testing may be useful as a proxy
of the cumulative incidence in addition to testing for virus, which would allow assessing whether
extensive transmission has occurred. In the existing guidelines, pigs must be serologically sampled
between 2 and 4 weeks from the date of culling. Nonetheless, should infection have occurred at the
culling day, it is highly unlikely that 14 days later a 5% seroprevalence will have been reached in a
reasonably sized pig herd, unless massive virus introduction would have taken place. The period of 14
days after the date of cull seems therefore too short.
Restricting testing of cats to dead cats seems justified given that infection in cats has only been
detected in dead cats associated with outbreaks in poultry (Harder and Vahlenkamp, 2010). This implies
that they act as a spill over host and not a reservoir host. Similarly, testing of other potentially susceptible
species like mink and equines should be restricted to animals showing clinical signs or that have died.
• 4th Scenario of sampling procedures
• TOR 1.1 and TOR 1.2 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 14(1) of the Delegated Regulation
• Article 57 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/429
• Commission Implemented Regulation 2018/1882 on listed species
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns an affected establishment officially confirmed
2) In the affected establishment there are kept animals of non-listed species of epidemiological relevance
for the control of the disease
3) Animals of non-listed species are those animals that are not listed in Commission Implementing
Regulation (EU) 2018/1882 for each of the category A diseases
4) The animal species acting purely as mechanical carriers of the virus will not be covered
5) The competent authority is not obliged to carry out the sampling of non-listed species, but they may
establish it in addition to other measures
6) The purpose of the sampling procedures is to ensure detection of the virus in these species
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Development of new procedures
A risk assessment should be made on the farm to assess the exposure of the non-listed species.
Swab sampling for virus detection should be focused at pigs that are clinically ill (respiratory signs,
fever), and those most intensively exposed to infected poultry (e.g. located near the poultry, fed with
broken eggs etc.). This will increase the likelihood of detecting the virus. Serological testing should
also focus on those animals that have been most intensively exposed to infected poultry (e.g. close
vicinity or feeding of broken eggs). Serological testing of pigs should not be done before 4 weeks after
culling of the poultry. Should infection have been introduced in the pig herd around the time of culling,
this would allow for a few generations of infected pigs and their time to seroconversion to reach a
detectable level of 5%. Clinically affected mink and equines on affected poultry establishments should
be sampled in a similar way as cats provided the risk assessment would indicate possible exposure.
4.1.1.5. For wild animals of the listed species within the HPAI affected establishment and
its surroundings
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures,
based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the wild animals of listed species
within the affected establishment and in its surroundings. The purpose of the sampling procedures is
to ensure the detection of the virus, if the virus is present in these wild species.
Summary of the sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
No guidelines available in the diagnostic manual.
Development of new procedures
Testing any dead animals of the listed species would be useful. Guidelines for carrying out passive
surveillance in wild birds should be followed. Birds included in the list of target species of interest for
HPAI defined by EFSA should be prioritised for sampling (EFSA, 2017).
4.1.1.6. For animals of listed species in the non-affected establishments located in a
protection zone
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of listed species in
establishments located in the protection zone up to 3 km radius. The purpose of the sampling
procedures is to ensure the detection of the virus, if the virus is present in these animals.
• 5th Scenario of sampling procedures
• TOR 1.1 and TOR 1.2 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 14(1) of the Delegated Regulation
• Article 57 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/429
• Commission Implemented Regulation 2018/1882 on listed species
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration during for the assessment:
1) It concerns an affected establishment officially confirmed
2) They may exist wild animals of listed species within the establishment and in the surroundings of the
establishment
3) The competent authority may establish these sampling procedures in addition to other measures
4) The purpose of the sampling procedures in wild animals of listed species is to ensure the detection of
the virus, if the virus is present in these wild species
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Summary of sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
Clinical inspection in the protection zone is prescribed as in Section 4.1.1.1 and given suspicion is
raised, standard sampling is applied. If there are no clinical signs, the standard samples must be taken
21 days following the date of the last suspected contact with an infected holding or when the poultry
or other captive birds are killed.
Assessment
In case of the presence of clinical signs, the assessment described in Section 4.1.1.1 applies.
In case of no signs, standard sampling in gallinaceous poultry is considered non-informative, as the
case fatality of HPAI is always very high, so the likelihood of detecting the virus in apparently healthy
birds in a flock where no dead birds or sick birds are present is extremely low. Clinical investigation will
be sufficient to confirm the presence of HPAI.
However, HPAI virus may induce mild or subclinical infection in Anseriformes; in this case sampling
of healthy birds is recommended similar to Section 4.1.1.1.
Development of new procedures
As per Section 4.1.1.1.
4.1.1.7. For non-affected establishments located in a surveillance zone
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures, based
on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of listed species, for the sampling
of the establishments located within the surveillance zone. The purpose of the sampling procedure is to
ensure disease detection if the virus is present in establishments within the surveillance zone.
• 8th Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.3 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 41 of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration during for the assessment (See
also the table in Annex B):
1) Ιt concerns the surveillance zone
2) Refers to the sampling of establishments with kept animals of the listed species in the surveillance zone
3) Official veterinarians carry out visits to a sample of the establishments among others to perform clinical
examination of kept animals of listed species and if necessary, collection of samples for laboratory
examination
4) The purpose of sampling procedure is to ensure the detection of the disease if the disease is present in
any of the establishments
• 6th Scenario of sampling procedures
• TOR 1.1 and TOR 1.2 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 26(2) of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration during for the assessment (See
also the table in Annex B):
1) It concerns the protection zone with radius up to 3 km
2) Official veterinarians must visit at least once all the non-affected establishments with kept animals of
listed species located in the protection zone
3) Among others, they must perform a clinical examination of kept animals of listed species and if
necessary, a collection of samples for laboratory examination
4) The purpose of sampling procedures is to confirm or rule out the presence of a category A disease
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Summary of the sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
The establishments to be visited are those in which increased morbidity, mortality or where change
in production data has been reported.
After investigating the production records and carrying out a clinical inspection, standard samples
must be taken from each production unit on those establishments that report increased mortality,
morbidity or change in production.
Assessment
The number of establishments that should be sampled within a surveillance zone may be limited to
those, where an increased morbidity, mortality or where a change in production data has been
reported. Because of this, the assessment would be similar to Section 4.1.1.1.
Development of new procedures
For Galliformes, no new procedures are needed. Due to the quick development of the disease, and
the extremely high mortality usually observed, HPAI can be easily detected by farmers; raising
awareness about the importance of early reporting of suspicions among poultry owners and keepers in
the zone would be primordial. The management of a suspicion would therefore be similar to
Section 4.1.1.1. For Anseriformes, relying on increased awareness might not be sufficient in case of a
virus strain that causes mild or no signs of infection in these species. In view of the objective to find
any infected establishment in the surveillance zone, establishments with Anseriformes in the
surveillance zone should be visited and sampled similar to those in the protection zone
(Section 4.1.1.6). Alternatively, farmers can be encouraged to collect dead birds to be pooled and
tested weekly (bucket sampling). Table 5 in Section 4.1.1.1 shows that even in cases where there is
no case fatality due to the virus, testing dead animals (irrespective of the cause of death) would lead
to HPAI detection if the virus is present in the flock with a median time between introduction and
detection of 6–11 days. Bucket sampling might even be more sensitive than shown in Table 5 as
comorbidity of HPAI will likely reduce the survival probability to other diseases. In addition,
Anseriformes farms could be tested serologically before the surveillance zone is lifted (60 samples per
farm, 3–4 weeks after the last outbreak).
4.1.2. Assessment of sampling procedures to grant derogations for animal
movements
4.1.2.1. From non-affected establishments located in the protection zone to
slaughterhouses located within the protection zone or in the surveillance zone or
outside the restricted zone
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of the animals of an establishment in a protection
zone, in order to grant a derogation from prohibitions in the movement of animals, and allow for the
animals to be moved to a slaughterhouse located within the protection zone or in the surveillance zone
or outside the restricted zone (Art29).
• 9th Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.4 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 28(5) of the Delegated Regulation
• Article 29 of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns the protection zone
2) It regards to the granting of a derogation for the movement of kept animals of the listed species from a
non-affected establishment in the protection zone
3) Animals to be moved to a slaughterhouse located within the protection zone or in the surveillance zone
or outside the restricted zone
4) Clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved
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Summary of sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
An investigation of production records and a clinical investigation should take place before moving
the animals to the slaughterhouse. Moreover, upon arrival at the slaughterhouse, a detailed
investigation should take place by an official veterinarian. The number of samples to be taken from
each production unit, less than 48 h prior to the time of departure of the poultry, should be based on
the outcome of a risk assessment, but at least 60 tracheal/oropharyngeal and/or 60 cloacal swabs
must be sampled.
Assessment
The procedure ensures that clinical signs of HPAI infection will be detected, and the sampling
procedure ensures that a 5% prevalence will be detected with 95% confidence. In case of gallinaceous
poultry, the testing will add little to the clinical inspection of the farm, which is much more informative
due to the rapid onset and severe nature of the disease in those species.
Development of new procedures
For gallinaceous poultry, clinical inspection on the day of the movement (and not at 48 h as
required in the diagnostic manual) would reduce the probability of virus transmission as HPAI might
develop very rapidly in such flocks (see Table 4 in Section 4.1.1.1). In the event that no clinical signs
are seen in gallinaceous poultry and provided production records indicate no issues at the time of
movement, sampling could be omitted. In contrast, in Anseriformes, clinical manifestation may be mild
or even absent, so the sampling as per diagnostic manual is recommended. In addition to the
sampling prior to the movement, the probability of moving infected birds could be further reduced by
weekly bucket sampling and testing (collecting dead birds in Anseriformes farms, pooling them and
testing them weekly (EFSA AHAW Panel et al., 2017)) (see Section 4.1.1.7).
4.1.2.2. For day-old-chicks (DOC) from a non-affected establishment located in the
protection zone, hatched from eggs originating in or outside the restricted zone
to an establishment located in the same Member State but if possible, outside
the restricted zone
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations, to grant a derogation from prohibitions in the
movement of day-old-chicks (DOC) located in the protection zone and hatched from eggs originating in
the restricted zone or outside the restricted zone. The sampling procedures should ensure the
movement of these day-old-chicks to an establishment located in the same Member State but if
possible, outside the restricted zone.
Summary of sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
For the movement of day-old-chicks (DOC), no inspection or testing is required. For the movement
of hatching eggs, inspection of the parent flock and standard sampling is required.
Assessment
The risk of spreading HPAI by DOC is considered very low (probability range) (EFSA AHAW Panel,
2017), because the virus is highly lethal for the embryo (preventing hatching), and the eggs are
disinfected before hatching. Infection will be noted in the hatchery and, moreover, as it takes at least
3 weeks between collecting the eggs and hatching, in gallinaceous poultry from the infected parent
• 10th Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.4 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 28(5) and article 30(1) of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration during for the assessment:
1) It concerns the protection zone
2) It regards to the granting of a derogation for the movement of day-old-chicks from a non-affected
establishment in the protection zone hatched from eggs originating in or outside the restricted zone
3) Day-old-chicks to be moved to an establishment located in the same Member State but if possible,
outside the restricted zone
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flock will have been detected before any DOC will have been moved. However, this may be different
for Anseriformes if the course of infection is mild.
Development of new procedures
In the absence of clinical signs during clinical inspection, standard sampling of gallinaceous parent
flocks could be omitted. In addition, in Anseriformes, parent flocks testing could be expanded by
bucket sampling and serological testing (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017).
4.1.2.3. For ready-to-lay poultry from a non-affected establishment located in the
protection zone to establishments located in the same MS and if possible, within
the restricted zone
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations, to grant a derogation from prohibitions in the
movement of ready-to-lay poultry located in the protection zone to establishments located in the same
MS and if possible within the restricted zone.
Summary of sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
As per Section 4.1.2.1.
Assessment
In this scenario, the consequences of missing the disease may be larger as birds are not sent to
slaughter but moved to another establishment.
Development of new procedures
The recommendations would be similar to those in Section 4.1.2.1. In addition, follow-up
investigation of the recipient farm would be useful. In gallinaceous poultry that would require
collecting information of any clinical manifestation. For Anseriformes that could include weekly bucket
sampling and serological testing 4 weeks after moving the birds.
4.1.2.4. From non-affected establishments located in the protection zone to a plant
approved for processing or disposal of animal by-products in which the animals
are immediately killed
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of the animals of an establishment in a protection
zone, in order to grant derogation from prohibitions in the movement of these animals to a plant
approved for processing or disposal of animal by-products in which the kept animals are immediately
killed (Art37).
• 11th Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.4 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 28(5) and article 30(2) of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration during for the assessment:
1) It concerns ready-to-lay poultry in non-affected establishments in the protection zone
2) It regards to the granting of a derogation for the movement of ready-to-lay poultry from a non-affected
establishment in the protection zone
3) Ready-to-lay poultry to be moved to an establishment located in the same Member State and if possible,
within the restricted zone
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Summary of sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
No specific sampling procedures are present in the diagnostic manual.
Assessment
As per Section 4.1.2.1.
Development of new procedures
As per Section 4.1.2.1.
4.1.2.5. From an establishment in a surveillance zone to a slaughterhouse located within
or outside the restricted zone and from an establishment outside the surveillance
zone to a slaughterhouse situated in the surveillance zone
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of the animals of listed species in order to grant
derogation from prohibitions and allow for these animals to be moved: (a) from an establishment in a
surveillance zone to a slaughterhouse located within or outside the restricted zone, (b) from an
establishment outside the surveillance zone to a slaughterhouse situated in the surveillance zone.
Summary of sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
No specific sampling procedures are present in the diagnostic manual.
Assessment
Although the a priori risk of infection in the surveillance zone should be lower than in the protection
zone (this is the case under the assumption of transmission increasing with decreased distance to an
outbreak); nonetheless, the transmission kernel results shown in Table 9 Section 4.3.1 indicate that
the probability of transmission of HPAI beyond 3 km is 52–33% (depending on the Kernel selected).
Because of this, the assessment would be the same as the assessment for the movement of birds from
establishments located in the protection zone (Section 4.1.2.1). For farms outside the surveillance zone
moving animals into the surveillance zone, no added inspection or testing would be needed.
• 13th Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.4 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 43(5) and article 44 of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration during for the assessment:
1) It concerns kept animals of listed species of the establishments in the surveillance zone
2) To grant derogation for movement from an establishment in the surveillance zone to be moved to a
slaughterhouse within the restricted zone or outside the restricted zone
3) To grant derogation for movement from an establishment outside the surveillance zone to a
slaughterhouse situated in the surveillance zone
4) Clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved
• 12th Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.4 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 28(5) and article 37 of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration for the assessment:
1) It concerns the protection zone
2) To grant derogation for movement of kept animals of listed species from a non-affected establishment in
the protection zone
3) The animals to be moved to a plant approved for processing or disposal of animal by-products
in which the kept animals are immediately killed
4) Clinical examinations and laboratory examinations of animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved
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Development of new procedures
As per Section 4.1.2.1.
4.1.2.6. For day-old-chicks from a non-affected establishment located in the surveillance
zone, to an establishment located in the same Member State where they were
hatched
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations to grant derogation of movements of day-old-chicks
hatched from establishment located in the surveillance zone, from eggs originating within the
surveillance zone and eggs originating outside the restricted zone, to an establishment located in the
same Member State where they were hatched.
Summary of sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
No specific sampling procedures are present in the diagnostic manual.
Assessment
As per Section 4.1.1.2.
Development of new procedures
As per Section 4.1.1.2.
4.1.2.7. For ready-to-lay poultry located in the surveillance zone to establishments
located in the same MS
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations, to grant a derogation from prohibitions in the
movement of ready-to-lay poultry located in the surveillance zone to establishments located in the
same MS.
• 16th Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.4 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 43(5) and article 46(1) of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration during for the assessment:
1) It concerns the surveillance zone
2) To grant derogation for movement of day-old-chicks hatched from establishment located in the
surveillance zone, from eggs originating from establishment within the surveillance zone or eggs
originating from outside the restricted zone
3) To be moved to an establishment located in the same Member State
4) Clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved
• 17th Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.4 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 43(5) and article 46(2) of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration during for the assessment:
1) It concerns the surveillance zone
2) Ready-to-lay poultry of an establishment in the surveillance zone
3) To be moved to an establishment located in the same Member State
4) Clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved
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Summary of sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
No specific sampling procedures are present in the diagnostic manual.
Assessment
As per Section 4.1.2.3.
Development of new procedures
As per Section 4.1.2.3.
4.1.2.8. From an establishment located in the restricted zone to move within the
restricted zone when restriction measures are maintained beyond the period set
out in Annex XI of the Delegated Regulation
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of the animals of an establishment located in the
restricted zone of an outbreak in order to allow their movement within the restricted zone, when
restriction measures are maintained beyond the period set out in Annex XI of the Delegated
Regulation.
Summary of sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
No specific sampling procedures are described in the diagnostic manual
Assessment
As per Section 4.1.2.3.
Development of new procedures
As per Section 4.1.2.3.
4.1.3. Assessment of sampling procedures for repopulation purposes
4.1.3.1. For the animals that are kept for the repopulation prior to their introduction
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on laboratory examinations of the animals that are kept for the repopulation prior to their
introduction to rule out the presence of the disease.
• 18th Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.4 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 56(1) of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration during for the assessment:
1) It concerns the restricted zone when restriction measures are maintained beyond the period set out in
Annex XI
2) To grant derogation for movement of kept animals of listed species from an establishment within the
restricted zone
3) Clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the establishment, including those
animals to be moved
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Summary of sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
The diagnostic manual estates that at least 20 blood samples should be tested as soon as the poultry
have been placed in the holding except in the case of day-old chicks; if appropriate, such sampling may
be performed on the holding of origin of the poultry before movement to the holding for repopulation.
According to the Delegated Act (Art. 59 (2), (3) and (9), samples shall be collected from:
– a representative number of all the animals to be introduced in the establishment, if they are
all introduced at the same time and from the same establishment of origin; or
– a representative number of animals of each consignment, if animals are all to be introduced
at different times or from different establishments of origin.
In the case of day-old-chicks, the competent authority may decide not to perform the sampling for
laboratory examination.
Assessment
If the birds originate from a disease-free area, sampling would not be needed. However, collecting
samples of 20 birds could be useful to detect antibodies induced by an LPAI infection that may not be
detected based on clinical signs. Such antibodies could prevent a clinical manifestation of infection of
the birds in case of ongoing infection. Because of this, the assessment remains the same as per
Section 4.1.1.5.
Development of new procedures
Not needed
4.1.3.2. In the event of unusual mortalities or clinical signs being notified during the
repopulation
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on laboratory examinations of the animals that have been repopulated, in the event of unusual
mortalities or clinical signs being notified during the repopulation, to rule out the presence of the
disease.
• 19th Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.5 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 59(2) of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration during for the assessment:
1) It concerns the repopulation of a previous affected establishment
2) Animals intended for repopulation shall be sampled prior to their introduction into the establishment of
destination
3) The samples shall be collected from a representative number of animals to be introduced of each
consignment from each establishment or from a representative number of animals of each consignment (if
animals are all to be introduced at different times or from different establishments of origin)
4) Laboratory examinations
5) The purpose sampling procedures is to rule out the presence of the disease
• 20th Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.5 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 59(9) of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration during for the assessment:
1) It concerns the repopulated establishment
2) Unusual mortalities or clinical signs during the repopulation
3) The official veterinarians shall without delay collect samples for laboratory examination
4) The purpose of sampling procedures is to rule out the presence of the disease
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Summary of sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
Samples of dead poultry or swabs taken from their carcasses from a maximum of 10 dead birds per
week during the 21-day period from the date of the re-population.
Assessment
Testing 10 dead birds will detect HPAI infection with a high probability (see Tables 4 and 5 in
Section 4.1.1.1). In addition, testing tracheal and cloacal swabs of 20 birds results in a high probability
of detection (See Figure 2 in Section 4.1.1.1). When dealing with a strain with a very mild infection,
additional samples may be required.
Development of new procedures
The protocol described in the diagnostic manual may be kept, but further testing is recommended
in waterfowl when dealing with a virus strain that induces mild infection. In this situation, it would be
recommended to test 60 healthy birds (tracheal and cloacal swabs) within the last week of the 21-day
period.
4.1.3.3. For repopulated animals
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness of disease-specific sampling procedures
based on laboratory examinations of the animals that have been repopulated, on the last day of the
monitoring period calculated forward from the date on which the animals were placed in the
repopulated establishment. In case the repopulation takes place in several days, the monitoring period
will be calculated forward from the last day in which the last animal is introduced in the establishment.
Summary of the sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual
Samples (or swabs) of 10 dead birds must be tested, and in waterfowl 20 tracheal and 20 cloacal
swabs should be taken within the last week of the 21-day period.
Assessment
Same as per Section 4.1.3.2.
Development of new procedures
Same as per Section 4.1.3.2.
4.2. Assessment of the length of the monitoring period for HPAI
The concept of the monitoring period was introduced as a management tool for the investigation
and control of suspected and confirmed outbreaks of Category A diseases in terrestrial animals. This
tool aimed to standardise the methodology by which relevant authorities responded to suspected and
confirmed cases of these diseases. In this regard, a disease-specific monitoring period was set for
each of the 14 diseases included in the Category A list. Throughout the EU legislation, the monitoring
period is used as an aid in the control of these diseases, although the specific purpose in which the
monitoring period is used varies depending on the articles of the legislation.
The length of the monitoring period for each disease is set out in Annex II of the Commission
Delegated Regulation supplementing the rules laid down in Part III of Regulation (EU) 2016/429
(Animal Health Law).
• 21st Scenario of sampling procedures
• ToR 1.5 in accordance with Mandate
• Article 59(5) of the Delegated Regulation
The following elements of the scenario should be taken into consideration during for the assessment:
1) It concerns the repopulated establishment
2) Animals that have been used for repopulation
3) Laboratory examinations
4) Sampling procedures to rule out the presence of the disease
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Annex D in this Opinion describes the seven scenarios for which an assessment of the length of the
monitoring period had been requested. Only six scenarios were assessed, as scenario number 5
(related to the movement of frozen semen) was considered not relevant in relation to HPAI.
For the assessment of ToR 2, the methodology described in Section 2.3 of the Technical Report
published by EFSA was followed (EFSA, 2020a). Some details of the methodology are presented in this
opinion in Section 3.2. In order to assess the length of the monitoring period, the purpose of this
monitoring period for each of the scenarios was ascertained.
To answer the ToR, an ELS on the average, shortest and longest period of time between the
earliest point of infection of a bird with a HPAI virus, and the time of reporting of a suspicion by the
competent authority, was carried out. The time period between reporting of a suspicion and
the notification of the disease was also assessed. Several outcomes were designed for the ELS, and
the results are presented below.
4.2.1. Results
A total of 1,090 references published after 01/01/2000 were retrieved. Among these references, 48
were selected to be included in the qualitative review. The full selection process is displayed in
Figure 3.
Information retrieved by the ELS is summarised in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 shows the information
retrieved for the main outcome of interest (period between the earliest point of infection and the
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FAO = 11, Google Scholar = 8, 
National websites = 4) 
Figure 3: PRISMA diagram for the extensive literature search on monitoring period for highly
pathogenic avian influenza
Control measures of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 31 EFSA Journal 2021;19(1):6372
For HPAI outbreaks in chickens, the shortest period between the earliest point of infection and the
suspicion report was estimated at 5.9 days by Hobbelen et al. (2020) using within-flock mortality data
from the 2016 H5N8 outbreak in a layer farm in the Netherlands. On the other hand, the longest
period, 14.8 days, was estimated by the same authors using within-flock mortality data from the 2014
outbreak.
For HPAI outbreaks in ducks, the only data retrieved were from Hobbelen et al. (2020) based on
mortality data from the 2016 H5N8 outbreaks in three meat duck farms. These results suggest that
the period between the earliest point of infection and the suspicion report is longer in duck than in
chicken HPAI outbreaks. Indeed, the mean period for ducks was estimated between 9.5 and
18.8 days. Based on these data, we calculated that the period between the earliest point of infection
and the suspicion report in duck HPAI outbreaks was on average 14.3 days (median = 14.5 days).
In summary and based on the data shown in Table 6:
– Average period = 10.3 days (chickens) and 14.3 days (ducks)
– Shortest period = 5.9 days (chickens) and 9.5 days (ducks)
– Longest period = 14.8 days (chickens) and 18.8 days (ducks)
In addition, other periods reported in the literature are described in Table 7. In Table 7, 10 values
of periods between the earliest point of infection and confirmation (AH - RC Animal Health -
Regulatory Committee, 2017c; APHA, 2017) were also extracted, the values ranging from 8 to 25 days.
As this period includes the period between suspicion report and confirmation (median/mean = 2 days,
as calculated from the articles retrieved), an average delay between the earliest point of infection and
suspicion report of 14 days (1–25 days) was estimated.
Table 7: Summary of the HPAI extraction for the delays in the outbreak reporting process
References (Ref.), number of extracted values (n), median, mean, minimal (min) and
maximal (max) values




Animal Health - Regulatory Committee (2017c);
APHA (2017)
10 16 16 8 25
Suspicion report
and confirmation
Animal Health - Regulatory Committee (2010,
2014a,b); OIE (World Organisation for Animal
Health) (2014); Animal Health - Regulatory
Committee (2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2015e);
APHA (2015a, 2015b); Animal Health - Regulatory
Committee (2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e,
2016f, 2016g, 2017a, 2017b, 2017d, 2017e,
2017f, 2017g, 2017h, 2018a, 2018b, 2020a,
2020b, 2020c)
29 2 2 0 7






Period between earliest point of
infection and suspicion report
(days)
Bos et al. (2007) Netherlands 2003 Chickens 12(1)









APHA (Animal & Plant
Health Agency) (2015)
United Kingdom 2015 Chickens 11(3)
(1): The mode.
(2): The mean of the period were estimated using SEIR models and within-flock mortality data, and based on the following
detection rule: ≥ 0.5% mortality on each of two consecutive days.
(3): Strong suspicion of first infection in an outbreak following contact with wild birds infected with LPAI followed by a mutation
event in poultry to HPAI (based on molecular epidemiology studies).
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4.2.2. Assessment
Considering the results presented above, an assessment of the effectiveness of the monitoring
period for HPAI, depending on the purpose of that period in the different scenarios shown in Annex D,
was carried out. For HPAI, the length of the existing monitoring period is 21 days.
Scenarios 1, 2 and 3
For the first third scenarios, the main purpose of the use of the monitoring period is to be able to
carry a full epidemiological investigation (i.e. in Scenarios 1 and 2, at the time of the suspicion and
confirmation, respectively), or part of the epidemiological investigation (i.e. scenario 3, where the aim
is to identify any possible epidemiological links between the affected establishment and any separated
non-affected epidemiological units). The length of the monitoring period should then dictate how far
back or forward the activities related to tracing (and other activities needed during an epidemiological
investigation) should go (checks for production records, animal movement records, etc.). This period
of time is the time where the infection could have been present undetected in an establishment, and
due to the regular activities carried out in this establishment, could have spread to other
epidemiological units. In the case of scenario 3, if no epidemiological links between the establishment
that has been confirmed positive and the other epidemiological units are found during the
investigation, and only if other conditions described in the legislation are met, a derogation from killing
the animals in the separated non-affected epidemiological units could be granted.
The period of time when the disease could have been present unknowingly in an establishment,
equates then to the time period between the entry of the HPAI virus in the establishment and the
reporting of the suspicion. Once the suspicion has been officially reported, control measures are
implemented, and further spread is in this way prevented.
Based on the results from Table 6, the period between the earliest point of infection and the
suspicion report in chicken HPAI outbreaks was on average 10.3 days with a maximum of 14.8 days.
In terms of the effectiveness of the length of the existing monitoring period for chicken HPAI
outbreaks, the Panel Members consider the existing length of the monitoring period (21 days) effective.
This assessment remains for scenario 3 even if the start of the monitoring period is counted from
the date of confirmation (instead of date in which the suspicion is reported) of the outbreak, as the
• 1st Scenario of monitoring period
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 8 and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation
• Article 57 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/429
• Aim: to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
backwards from the date of the notification of the suspicion of a category A disease in an establishment
with kept animals of listed species, for the purposes of the epidemiological enquiry in the event of a
suspicion of a HPAI outbreak
• 2nd Scenario of monitoring period
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 17(2) and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation
• Article 57 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/429
• Aim: to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
backwards from the date of notification of the suspicion of a category A disease in an establishment with
kept animals of listed species, for the purposes of the epidemiological enquiry in the event of confirmation
of a HPAI outbreak
• 3rd Scenario of monitoring period
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 13(b) and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation
• Aim: to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
backwards from the date of confirmation of a HPAI outbreak in an epidemiological unit in which the
disease has not been confirmed, in order to provide derogations from killing the animals in these unit, if
this unit has been completely separated, and handled by different personnel during this monitoring period
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average time between suspicion and confirmation is 2 days based on our results. This will lead to an
average length between the first entry and the confirmation of 12.3 days for chickens.
In terms of the effectiveness of the length of the existing monitoring period for ducks, and in
general for Anseriformes HPAI outbreaks, the ELS carried out reflects the lack of literature addressing
the time between disease entry and the reporting of the suspicion. From the available data, the mean
period for ducks was estimated between 9.5 and 18.8 days, with an average of 14.3 days. Based on
these results, the Panel Members consider the existing length of the monitoring period effective.
Nonetheless, this assessment should be taken cautiously due to the data being retrieved from a
unique reference. Also, it must be noted that clinical signs in Anseriformes are not always obvious or
present. This would likely result in longer periods (compared to chickens and other species in the
Galliformes order), where the disease could have been unknowingly present in the establishment.
Serological investigation could provide more information in those cases (see Section 4.1.1.2), but a
precise length of this period cannot be established (see H5N1 in France 2015/16).
To reduce the uncertainty in the length of the period between introduction and the suspicion report
for Anseriformes, it is recommended to collect further information during future outbreaks.
Scenario 4
The main purpose of the monitoring period in scenario 4 is to ensure that certain products or
materials, likely to spread the disease that have been produced in a non-affected establishment located
in the protection zone of an affected establishment, can be moved safely and without posing a risk of
disease spread. In this scenario, and in contrast with the previous three scenarios, the establishment of
concern is not either a suspect establishment or an affected establishment. For the assessment of this
scenario, we assume that the earliest plausible point of infection of these products or materials in the
establishment of concern would be the earliest plausible point of infection of the establishment that
originated the protection zone. If these products have been obtained or produced before the earliest
point of infection of the affected establishment, then they could be exempted from prohibitions to be
moved, as long as other conditions specified in the legislation are met (e.g. the products must have been
clearly separated during the production process, storage and transport, from products not eligible for
dispatch outside the restricted zone).
Considering the average length of time between the earliest point of entry and suspicion in
establishments with chickens of 10.3 days, and the maximum period of 14.8 days extracted from
Table 6 above, the Panel Members consider the existing length of the monitoring period (21 days)
effective; the same assessment applies for establishments containing species of the Anseriformes order
(average of 14.3 days with a longest period of 18.8 days). As discussed for Scenarios 1, 2 and 3, it is
recommended to collect further information during future outbreaks in order to better assess the
earliest point of infection in Anseriformes establishments.
Scenarios 6 and 7
• 4th Scenario of monitoring period
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 27(3)c and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation
• Aim: to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
backwards from the date of notification of the suspicion of the latest HPAI outbreak in the protection zone.
Products or other materials likely to spread the disease, must had been obtained or produced, before this
time period in order to be exempted from prohibitions of movements
• 6th Scenario of monitoring period
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 57 (1) and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation
• Aim: to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
forward from the date of the final cleaning and disinfection in an HPAI affected establishment, after which
the repopulation of the establishment may be allowed by the competent authority (assuming relevant
control of insects and rodents was carried out)
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In Scenarios 6 and 7, the monitoring period is used in the context of repopulation. In Scenario 6,
the monitoring period is used to ensure that repopulation is not put at risk due to the disease still
being present unknowingly in poultry establishments within the surrounding area of the establishment
to be repopulated (if an establishment tested positive to HPAI virus within a distance equal or lower to
the radius of the surveillance zone, the repopulation process could not take place). Repopulation can
only take place after a number of days equal to the monitoring period have elapsed since the final
cleaning and disinfection of the affected establishment.
In this regard the number of days of the monitoring period for HPAI, counted from the day of the final
cleaning and disinfection must ensure enough time for any potentially infected surrounding establishment
to be reported as a suspicion. Considering the results presented above, the Panel Members consider the
existing length of the monitoring period (21 days) effective, as it would allow for the identification of any
potentially infected establishment in the surrounding area prior to the repopulation taking place.
In Scenario 7, the monitoring period must be counted forwards from the date in which the first
animal is introduced into the establishment to be repopulated, with all the animals intended for
repopulation of this establishment being introduced within the length of time of this monitoring period.
The aim of the monitoring period in this scenario is to ensure the early detection of any potentially
recently infected animal intended for repopulation once they have been moved into the repopulated
establishment. Although the preferred option is that all animals or flocks are introduced into the
establishment to be repopulated at the same time, this is not always feasible. The first clinical and
laboratory sampling of the repopulated animals takes place once all the animals are in situ. By restricting
the period of time animals may be introduced into the establishment, the period of time the disease could
be unknowingly spreading within the establishment is reduced. Assuming that the latest point of infection
of the first poultry batch introduced into the repopulated establishment is the day when the birds are
moved, clinically ill birds would be observed at the first visit, if this visit is carried out a number of days
equal to the incubation period, or more precisely after the incubation plus notification period (as a
minimum prevalence may be needed in order to detect the presence of the disease in the flock). The
Panel Members consider the existing length of the monitoring period (21 days) effective, as it would allow
for early detection at the first visit following re-stocking of potentially infected birds.
4.3. Assessment of the minimum radius and time periods of the
protection and surveillance zones set in place subsequent to a
disease outbreak
4.3.1. Assessment of the minimum radius
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness to control the spread of HPAI by implementing
a protection and surveillance zones of a minimum radius, as set out in Annex Vof the Delegated Regulation,
surrounding the establishment where the disease has been confirmed. Based on this regulation, the
minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones for HPAI should be of 3 and 10 km, respectively.
Results
To answer this ToR, transmission kernels have been used to analyse outbreak data
for two epidemics of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Europe (Table 8). Transmission kernels show
the probability of infection of a farm as a function of the distance to an infected farm. The same
functional form for the kernel was used in both cases, namely,
k(r) ¼ ð1þ ðr/d0ÞaÞ1
where k is the kernel, r is the distance to an infected farm, d0 is the distance at which the kernel is
reduced by 50%, and a is the parameter controlling how rapidly the kernel declines with distance. The
• 7th Scenario of monitoring period
• ToR 2 in accordance with article 59 (4) and Annex II of the Delegated Regulation
• Aim: to assess the effectiveness of the length of the Monitoring Period, as the time period calculated
forward from the date the first animal was introduced for the purpose of repopulation after an HPAI
outbreak, during this monitoring period, all animals of the listed species intended for repopulation should
be introduced
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fitted kernels vary in shape between the epidemics (Figure 4). Of the four kernels fitted
to the The Netherland 2003 data, the extended kernel was used for the zone size assessment. In this
case, the kernel parameters were estimated allowing for (uninfected) farms in neighbouring countries
and so was deemed to be most relevant for the European situation.
For the extended Netherlands and Italian kernels, the probability of transmission beyond given
distances (if transmission were to occur from an infected establishment) was computed using the
estimates, lower 95% confidence limits and upper 95% confidence limits, including beyond the
proposed radius for the protection and surveillance zones (3 km and 10 km, respectively) (Figure 5)
(as mentioned above the rest of the kernels from the Netherlands were not used further). In addition,
the distances at which a threshold probability of transmission beyond that distance is reached were
also calculated for each kernel using the estimates, lower 95% confidence limits and upper 95%
confidence limits (Figure 5). The corresponding values computed using the estimates
are summarised in Tables 9 and 10.
As expected, we see a clear decrease in infection probability as the distance to an infected farm
increases. It is important to note that kernels combine all transmission routes for a virus into a single
description. The kernels presented here have been estimated for H7 viruses in epidemics where wild
birds did not play an important role. This has the advantage that the kernels result from between farm
transmission and are useful for establishing a zone around an infected farm aiming to reduce the risk
of spread associated with that particular infected farm. As movement of animals can take place over
much larger distances, if included in the kernel estimates, these animal movements will extend the
kernel tails. Obviously, the kernels cannot predict the risk of farms to become infected by infected wild
birds as their habitat is not restricted to the affected farm.





The Netherlands 2003, default 1.9 (1.1, 2.9) 2.1 (1.8, 2.4) Boender et al. (2007)
The Netherlands 2003, extended 3.1 (2.3, 4.1) 2.7 (2.5, 3.0)
The Netherlands 2003, HRP 1.8 (0.7, 2.9) 2.7 (2.4, 6.9)
The Netherlands 2003, LRP 5.4 (2.8, 9.2) 2.5 (2.0, 3.1)
Italy 1999–2000 2.2 (1.4, 2.9) 2.1 (1.9, 2.3) Dorigatti et al. (2010)
*: 95% confidence or credible intervals are shown in brackets.
Figure 4: Transmission kernels for highly pathogenic avian influenza virus
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Figure 5: Assessment of the radius of the protection and surveillance zone for highly pathogenic
avian influenza virus. The top panel shows the probability of transmission beyond a given
distance (if transmission were to occur from an infected establishment) computed using the
estimates (blue circles) and the lower and upper 95% confidence limits (error bars) for the
extended Netherlands and Italian kernels in Table 8. The thick black line indicates the
median probability for all kernels. The black dotted lines indicate threshold probabilities of
0.05 and 0.01. The bottom panel shows the distances at which a threshold probability of
transmission beyond that distance is reached calculated using the estimates (circles) and
lower and upper 95% confidence limits (error bars) for each kernel. The thick black line
indicates the median distance for the two kernels that were assessed. The black dotted
lines indicate distances of 3 km and 10 km (i.e. the proposed radius of the protection and
surveillance zones, respectively)
Table 9: Probability of transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus beyond different
distances
Distance (km)
3 5 10 15 20 25 50
NL 2003 0.52 0.22 0.04 0.01 0.007 0.004 < 0.001
IT 1999 0.33 0.15 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.006 0.001
Table 10: Distances (km) at which the probability of transmission of highly pathogenic avian
influenza virus beyond that distance reaches a threshold level
Threshold probability of transmission
0.001 0.005 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5
NL 2003 40.0 22.0 17.0 9.2 7.0 5.2 3.1
IT 1999 59.5 27.4 19.6 8.9 6.2 4.2 2.2
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Assessment
Table 9 shows that, if transmission occurs, the probability of transmission from an infected farm
beyond the protection zone is 0.52 (the Netherlands) and 0.33 (Italy), respectively. Likewise, the
probability of transmission beyond the surveillance zone is 0.04 for both the Dutch and Italian estimates.
Considering the probability of transmission (0.04) outside the surveillance zone, and the fact that
subsequent to the lifting of the protection zone, the control measures applied to the surveillance zone
remain in the protection zone, it is concluded that the probability of transmission outside the surveillance
zone is below 5%, which is aligned with the 95% probability mentioned in some articles of the AHL.
Nonetheless, when assessing independently the probability of transmission beyond the protection zone,
we observed that the estimates are high using the 3 km radius. For the Netherlands, the proportion of
transmission events inside and outside the protection zone is very similar (0.48 vs 0.52, respectively). To
reduce the transmission probability beyond the protection zone to 0.1, the radius should be increased to
7 km. The cost for this is that many more farms will have to be visited (assuming equal distribution across
the region, the number of farms in the protection zone would increase by a factor 5.4). Given that HPAI
in gallinaceous poultry inevitably causes high mortality it will almost certainly be noted and reported. This
may be different for Anseriformes in case of a virus strain with limited mortality. Weekly testing of dead
birds (bucket sampling) would be an appropriate strategy to take this into account (see Section 4.1.1.7).
Aside, the 95% probability described above to be used as a threshold is an aleatory figure and depends
on a manager willingness to accept risk (as having a zero-risk policy is not an option). If the aim is to
reduce the probability of transmission beyond the surveillance zone to 0.01 (and not 0.05 as assumed
above), the radius should be increased to 17 (the Netherlands) or 20 km (Italy). This, nonetheless, would
on average increase the number of farms in the surveillance zone (affected by movement restrictions)
fourfold.
It is important to note that these probabilities do not take into account the risk of transmission
imposed by wild birds, as very few wild birds were involved in the epidemics from which these data
were extracted.
4.3.2. Assessment of the minimum period
The purpose of this section is to assess the effectiveness to control the spread of disease of the
minimum periods during which the competent authority should apply the restriction measures in the
protection and surveillance zones as set out in Annex X and XI of the Delegated Regulation
supplementing the rules laid down in Part III of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 (AHL).
The length of the minimum period of the protection zone and surveillance zone are 15 and 30
days, respectively. In the protection zone, all farms are visited for a clinical inspection. This will aim at
detecting infections that have started before control measures were implemented. The aim is to
quickly identify infected farms. The movement control applies for 30 days, ensuring that possibly
infected poultry in both protection zone and surveillance zone is not moved to uninfected farms.
From Table 6 in Section 4.2.1, it follows that the median time between introduction and suspicion is
10.3 days in chickens and 14.4 days in ducks. The maximum period between introduction and
suspicion is 18.8 days. Moreover, the periods in this table refer to new outbreaks in previously
unaffected regions and will likely be shorter in case of actively looking for the infection. Consequently,
the duration of 30 days movement ban is effective to detect infected poultry farms and to prevent the
movement of infected poultry from the surveillance zone. However, this should be accompanied by
active surveillance in farms with Anseriformes in the surveillance zone as recommended in
Section 4.1.1.7.
4.3.3. Uncertainty analysis
Although several sources of uncertainty were identified during the scientific assessment (see
Annex G), their impact on the outputs of the assessment could not be quantified.
5. Conclusions and Recommendations
A summary of the conclusions and recommendations made for each of the scenarios assessed
within each of three ToRs is presented below. For ToR 1, the recommendations were based on the
sections with the development of new sampling procedures.
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ToR 1
Sampling procedure
Laboratory guidelines based on Commission Decision




In the event of a suspicion
of HPAI in an establishment
where animals of the
listed species are kept
Standard samples to be taken:
For virological testing:
– at least 5 sick/dead birds and/or
– at least 20 tracheal/oropharyngeal and 20 cloacal swabs (or
from all birds if a small number of birds present)
Birds showing clinical signs must be targeted
For serological testing:
– at least 20 blood samples (or from all birds if small number
of birds present)
Birds appearing sick or that have apparently recovered must be
targeted
Taking the standard sample
sizes of 5 dead birds or samples
of 20 sick birds for the
investigation of a suspicion is
sufficient to detect HPAI in
gallinaceous poultry in
general within 10 days after
introduction
In case of a virus strain that is
associated with clinical disease in
Anseriformes, sampling 5 dead
birds, or 20 sick birds is sufficient
to detect HPAI in Anseriformes
poultry
In case of a virus strain causing
low transmission either in
Gallinaceous or Anseriformes,
taking 5 samples from dead birds
or 20 samples from sick birds
would not lead to the detection
with 95% confidence if samples
are taken 10 or less days
subsequent to the viral
introduction
A combination of testing 5 dead birds
and 20 sick birds is recommended in
Gallinaceous and Anseriformes poultry to
prevent relatively late detection that
could occur when dealing with a strain
with a low transmission rate parameter
In case of a virus that does not induce
mortality, or clear clinical signs,
confirmation of a suspicion could be
done by testing 20 sick birds (if
available), or 60 healthy birds, for PCR or
serology, per production unit
4.1.1.2
For the purposes of the
epidemiological
enquiry as referred to
Article 57 of Regulation (EU)
2016/429 in an HPAI officially
confirmed establishment
Standard samples must be taken from poultry and other
captive birds which are killed, in each production unit
Standard sampling
(Section 4.1.1.1) is useful to
establish how widespread the
infection is across the farm
in case of multiple production units
and in case of preventive killing
To establish the length of the infectious
period in gallinaceous poultry, the
temporal pattern of daily mortality prior
to detection can be used to estimate
the most likely time window of
introduction, in Anseriformes serological
testing will be helpful for that purpose
(43 samples per production unit)
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ToR 1
Sampling procedure
Laboratory guidelines based on Commission Decision
(2006/437/EC) in accordance with Article 7 of
Directive 2005/94/EC
Conclusions Recommendations
4.1.1.3 For granting a specific
derogation from killing
animals of the categories of
article 13.2 of the Delegated
Regulation in an HPAI
affected establishment
Samples must be taken for laboratory testing, 21 days
following the date of the last positive finding of HPAI from each
production unit and at 21 days intervals
Samples to be taken:
i) samples of any dead poultry or other captive birds present at
the time of sampling;
ii) where practical, tracheal/oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs
from at least 60 poultry or other captive birds or from all
such poultry or other captive birds where less than 60 are
present on the holding; or if the birds are small, exotic and
not used to being handled or handling them would be
dangerous for people, samples of fresh faeces must be
collected
However, the competent authority may grant derogations from
the sample size referred to in i) and ii), based on the outcome
of a risk assessment
The sampling and laboratory testing of such samples must
continue until two consecutive negative laboratory results are
obtained which must be at least 21 days apart
Collecting and testing of any dead
bird will most likely be sufficient in
gallinaceous poultry
It is recommended to maintain the
current procedure, although serological
testing could be added when possible
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Laboratory guidelines based on Commission Decision




For the animals of non-listed
species kept in an HPAI
affected establishment
Samples to be taken:
i) Nasal/oropharyngeal swabs from at least 60 pigs from each
production unit or from all pigs where less than 60 pigs are
present in the production unit, must be taken before or on
the day the infected poultry or other captive birds are culled
ii) At least 60 blood samples must be collected from the pigs,
two to four weeks from the date of the cull. Samples must
be collected in such a way that at least one sample is
obtained from groups of pigs that are in direct contact with
each other
Samples to be taken before pigs can be moved out of the
establishment:
i) The movement of pigs to other holdings may be authorised
if at least 60 nasal/oropharyngeal swabs and 60 blood
samples from pigs, from each production unit, 14 days
following the date of the positive findings of the presence of
AI have given negative results
ii) The movement of pigs to a slaughterhouse may be
authorised if at least 60 nasal/oropharyngeal swabs, from
each production unit, 14 days following the date of the
positive findings of the presence of AI have given negative
results
iii) In the case of inconclusive or positive laboratory results, any
further investigations required to exclude the infection or
transmission of AI amongst pigs
In non-listed species a risk
assessment should be made on
the farm to assess the exposure of
the non-listed species
Swab sampling for virus
detection should be
focused at pigs that are
clinically ill, and those most
intensively exposed to
infected poultry. Serological testing
is also focused on those animals
that have been most intensively
exposed to infected poultry
Serological testing of pigs should not be
done before 4 weeks after culling of the
poultry
Clinically affected mink and equines on
an affected poultry farm should be
sampled in a similar way as
cats provided the risk assessment would
indicate possible exposure
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Where the official veterinarian has a suspicion that other
domestic mammals on the holdings, in particular those with
identified susceptibility to infection with AI viruses of H5 and
H7 subtypes, may have been in contact with the infected
poultry or other captive birds, samples for laboratory tests
must be taken. Investigations in other mammals other than
pigs which are susceptible to AI including cats must be
undertaken
With specific reference to HPAI H5N1, the following must be
carried out for testing cats: gross pathological lesions,
associated with viral replication, concentrate on the lungs and
liver, therefore samples for virological investigations must
preferably be taken from these organs of dead animals. In
living animals, preferably tracheal/oropharyngeal swabs must
be taken for virus detection. In addition, faecal swabs can be
taken separately
4.1.1.5
For wild animals of the
listed species within the HPAI
affected establishment and its
surroundings
No specific guidelines described No guidelines Testing any dead animals of the listed
species would be useful. Guidelines for
carrying out passive surveillance in wild
birds should be followed. Birds included
in the list of target species of interest for
HPAI defined by EFSA should be
prioritised for sampling
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For animals of listed species
in the non-affected
establishments located in a
protection zone
If there are clinical signs present in poultry or other captive
birds or indications of an increase in daily mortality (> 3 times
normal mortality rate of the flock) or a depression in daily egg
production (> 5%) or a decrease in daily feed and/or water
intake (> 5%): the standard samples must be taken
immediately from each production unit
If there are no signs, the standard samples must be taken 21
days following the date of the last suspected contact with an
infected holding or when the poultry or other captive birds are
killed
If there are no signs but the species of poultry or other captive
birds are not expected to clearly express clinical signs of
disease, or in the case of vaccinated birds, the competent
authority may decide, based on the outcome of a risk
assessment that the standard samples must be taken from
each production unit
In case of clinical signs, standard
sampling is sufficient
(Section 4.1.1.1)
In the absence of clinical signs, clinical
inspection is sufficient in gallinaceous




located in a surveillance zone
Standard samples must be taken from each production unit For gallinaceous poultry sampling
only establishments where an
increased morbidity, mortality or
where a change in production
data have been reported is
sufficient, for Anseriformes, this
may be insufficient in case of a
virus strain with mild virulence to
Anseriformes
In view of the objective to find any
infected establishment in the surveillance
zone, establishments with Anseriformes
in the surveillance zone should be visited
and sampled similar to those in the
protection zone (Section 4.1.1.6).
Alternatively, farmers can be encouraged
to collect dead birds to be pooled and
tested weekly (bucket sampling)
4.1.2.1
From non-affected
establishments located in the
protection zone to
slaughterhouses located
within the protection zone or
in the surveillance zone or
outside the restricted zone
Samples to be taken based on the outcome of a risk
assessment: at least 60 tracheal/oropharyngeal and/or 60
cloacal swabs must be taken from poultry from each
production unit to be sent to slaughter less than 48 h prior to
the time of departure of the poultry
In case of gallinaceous poultry, this
sampling will add little to the
clinical inspection of the farm,
which is much more informative
due to the rapid onset and severe
nature of the disease in those
species
A clinical inspection on the day of the
movement is recommended for
gallinaceous poultry. In Anseriformes,
weekly testing of dead birds (bucket
sampling) is recommended to reduce the
probability of moving infected birds
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establishment located in the
protection zone, hatched
from eggs originating in or
outside the restricted zone to
an establishment located in
the same Member State but if
possible, outside the
restricted zone
Guidelines do not require any clinical or laboratory examination
of the day-old-chicks but the holding of destination must be
placed under surveillance (see Section 4.1.1.6)
Standard samples must be taken from each production unit of
a parent flock holding prior to the movement of hatching eggs
The risk of spreading HPAI by DOC
is considered very low
In the absence of clinical
signs during clinical inspection, standard
sampling of gallinaceous parent
flocks could be omitted
In Anseriformes, parent flocks
testing could be expanded by bucket
sampling and serological testing
4.1.2.3
For ready-to-lay poultry from
a non-affected establishment
located in the protection zone
to establishments located in
the same MS and if possible,
within the restricted zone
Samples to be taken based on the outcome of a risk
assessment: at least 60 tracheal/oropharyngeal and/or 60
cloacal swabs must be taken from poultry from each
production unit to be sent to slaughter less than 48 h prior to
the time of departure of the poultry
In case of
gallinaceous poultry, this sampling
will add little to the clinical
inspection of the farm, which is
much more informative due to
the rapid onset and severe nature
of the disease in those species
A clinical inspection on the day of the
movement is recommended for
gallinaceous poultry. In Anseriformes,
weekly testing of dead birds (bucket
sampling) is recommended to reduce the
probability of moving infected birds
Follow-up testing in the recipient flock is
recommended. In Galliformes, this
implies collecting information of any
clinical manifestation, in Anseriformes
that could be complemented by bucket
sampling and serological testing 4 weeks
after moving the birds
4.1.2.4
From non-affected
establishments located in the
protection zone to a plant
approved for processing or
disposal of animal by-
products in which the animals
are immediately killed
No specific guidelines described 4.1.2.1 4.1.2.1
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From an establishment in a
surveillance zone to a
slaughterhouse located within
or outside the restricted
zone and from an
establishment outside the
surveillance zone to a
slaughterhouse situated in
the surveillance zone
No specific guidelines described Because there is a considerable
risk of an infected farm in the
surveillance zone, a similar
procedure to the protection zone
would be advisable
A clinical inspection on the day of the
movement is recommended for
gallinaceous poultry. In Anseriformes,
weekly testing of dead birds (bucket
sampling) is recommended to reduce the
probability of moving infected birds
4.1.2.6
For day-old-chicks from a
non-affected establishment
located in the surveillance
zone, to an establishment
located in the same Member
State where they were
hatched
No specific guidelines described 4.1.1.2 4.1.1.2
4.1.2.7
For ready-to-lay poultry
located in the surveillance
zone to establishments
located in the same MS
No specific guidelines described 4.1.2.3 4.1.2.3
4.1.2.8
From an establishment
located in the restricted
zone to move within the
restricted zone when
restriction measures are
maintained beyond the period
set out in Annex XI of
the Delegated Regulation
No specific guidelines described 4.1.2.3 4.1.2.3
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For the animals that are kept
for the repopulation prior to
their introduction
The diagnostic manual, Article 49(3)(b) and (c) —
Re-population of holdings, specifies that ‘if appropriate’ at least
20 blood samples should be taken as soon as the poultry have
been placed in the holding except in the case of day-old chicks;
if appropriate such sampling may be performed on the holding
of origin of the poultry before movement to the holding for
re-population
The Delegated Regulation (Art. 59 (2), (3) and (9)),
supplementing Regulation (EU) 2016/429 estates that:
Samples shall be collected from:
i) A representative number of all the animals to be introduced
in the establishment, if they are all introduced at the same
time and from the same establishment of origin; or
ii) A representative number of animals of each consignment, if
animals are all to be introduced at different times or from
different establishments of origin
In the case of day-old-chicks, the competent authority may
decide not to perform the sampling for laboratory examination
If the birds originate from a
disease-free area, sampling would
not be needed for HPAI
Collecting samples of 20 birds
could be useful to detect
antibodies induced by an LPAI
infection that may not be detected
based on clinical signs
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In the event of unusual
mortalities or clinical signs
being notified during the
repopulation
4.1.3.3
For animals that have been
repopulated
Samples to be taken during routine surveillance of repopulated
establishments from each production unit:
i) At least 20 blood samples as soon as the poultry have been
placed in the holding except in the case of day-old chicks; if
appropriate such sampling may be performed on the holding
of origin of the poultry before movement to the holding for
re-population
ii) Samples of dead poultry or swabs taken from their
carcasses from a maximum of 10 dead birds per week
during the 21-day period from the date of the re-population
iii) Where the holding has previously been infected with HPAI
20 tracheal/oropharyngeal and 20 cloacal swabs must also
be taken from waterfowl (ducks/geese) from each
production unit, if appropriate, within the last week of the
21-day period from the date of re-population
Nonetheless, no specific sampling procedures are described in
the event of unusual mortalities or clinical signs being notified
during the repopulation
Testing 10 dead birds will detect
HPAI infection with a high
probability.
Testing tracheal and cloacal
swabs of 20 birds results in a high
probability of detection. When
dealing with a strain with a very
mild infection additional samples
may be required
When dealing with a virus strain with
mild virulence in waterfowl, it would be
recommended to test 60 healthy birds
(tracheal and cloacal swabs) within the








Based on the time between virus introduction and outbreaks confirmation from
literature, the existing length of the monitoring period are considered effective
for gallinaceous poultry and for Anseriformes
It is recommended to keep the length of the monitoring period
To reduce the uncertainty in the length of the period between
introduction and the suspicion report for Anseriformes, it is
recommended to collect further information during future
outbreaks
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It is concluded that the probability of transmission outside the
surveillance zone is below 5%.
The probability of transmission beyond the protection zone is
approximately 50%.
It is important to note that these probabilities do not take into
account the risk of transmission imposed by wild birds.
To reduce the transmission probability beyond the protection
zone to 0.1, the radius should be increased to 7 km, but this
would increase the number of farms in the protection zone by
a factor 5.4
It is recommended to keep the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance
zones
For Anseriformes poultry, in order to increase the probability of detecting outbreaks in
the surveillance zone, weekly bucket sampling or carrying out serological sampling




The duration of 30 days movement ban is effective to detect
infected poultry farms and to prevent the movement of
infected poultry from the surveillance zone
It is recommended to keep the duration of restriction zones
During the surveillance period, active surveillance in farms with Anseriformes in the
surveillance zone is recommended
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ASF African swine fever
AHS African horse sickness
AGID agar gel immunodiffusion
CSF Classical swine fever
CBPP Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia
CCPP Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia
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ELISAs enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays
ELS extensive literature search
FMD Foot and mouth disease
HPAI Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
IVPI Intravenous Pathogenicity Index
LPAI low pathogenic avian influenza
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NCD Newcastle disease virus
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RT-PCR real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction
RVFV Rift Valley fever virus
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ToR Terms of Reference
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Annex A – Definitions in EU legislation
Terms Definitions
Clinical examination The clinical examination comprises: (i) an initial general evaluation of the animal health status of the establishment which comprises all the
animals of listed species kept in the establishment; and (ii) an individual examination of the animals included in the sample referred to in point




Means any permanent, geographically limited establishment, created on a voluntary basis and approved for the purpose of movements, where the
animals are: (a) kept or bred for the purposes of exhibitions, education, the conservation of species or research; (b) confined and separated from
the surrounding environment; and (c) subject to animal health surveillance and biosecurity measures; (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(48))
Epidemiological unit Means a group of animals with the same likelihood of exposure to a disease agent; (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(39))
Establishment Means any premises, structure, or, in the case of open-air farming, any environment or place, where animals or germinal products are kept, on a
temporary or permanent basis, except for: (a) households where pet animals are kept; (b) veterinary practices or clinics; (AHL: Regulation 2016/
429 article 4(27))
Health status Means the disease status as regards the listed diseases relevant for a particular listed species with respect to: (a) an animal; (b) animals within:
(i) an epidemiological unit; (ii) an establishment; (iii) a zone; (iv) a compartment; (v) a Member State; (vi) a third country or territory; (AHL:
Regulation 2016/429 article 4(34))
Infected zone Means a zone in which restrictions on the movements of kept and wild animals or products and other disease control and biosecurity measures
may be applied with the view to preventing the spread of a category A disease in the event of official confirmation of the disease in wild animals;
(Delegated Regulation article 2(15))
Kept animals Means animals which are kept by humans, including, in the case of aquatic animals, aquaculture animals; (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(5))
Outbreak Means the officially confirmed occurrence of a listed disease or an emerging disease in one or more animals in an establishment or other place
where animals are kept or located; (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4 (40)
Protection zone Means a zone around and including the location of an outbreak, where disease control measures are applied in order to prevent the spread of the
disease from that zone; (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(42))
Listed diseases Means diseases listed in accordance with Article 5(1); (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4 (18))
List of the diseases (AHL: Regulation 2016/429, Annex II)
Listed species Means an animal species or group of animal species listed in accordance with Article 8(2), or, in the case of emerging diseases, an animal species
or group of animal species which meets the criteria for listed species laid down in Article 8(2); (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(20))
List of species and groups of species (Commission Implemented Regulation 2018/1882)
Monitoring periods It is appropriate to follow a single approach for the measures to apply in the event of a category A disease. However, the epidemiology of
diseases should be taken into account to establish the appropriate moment for the competent authority to apply control measures and to carry
out investigations if there is suspicion or confirmation of those diseases. Therefore ‘monitoring periods’ should be provided, as reference time
frames for each category A disease affecting terrestrial animals based on incubation periods and other relevant elements that may affect the
spread of the disease; (Delegated Regulation whereas 10)
Restricted zone Means a zone in which restrictions on the movements of certain animals or products and other disease control measures are applied, with a view
to preventing the spread of a particular disease into areas where no restrictions are applied; a restricted zone may, when relevant, include
protection and surveillance zones; (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(41))
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Terms Definitions
Surveillance zone Means a zone which is established around the protection zone, and where disease control measures are applied in order to prevent the spread of
the disease from the protection zone; (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(43))
Wild animals Means animals which are not kept animals; (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4(8))
Zone Means: (a) for terrestrial animals, an area of a Member State, third country or territory with a precise geographical delimitation, containing an
animal subpopulation with a distinct health status with respect to a specific disease or specific diseases subject to appropriate surveillance, disease
control and biosecurity measures; (AHL: Regulation 2016/429 article 4 (35))
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Annex B – Scenarios of ToR 1






1st Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures of animals of listed species
in a suspected establishment, based on clinical
examination (TOR 1.1) and laboratory
examination (TOR 1.2), in their ability to detect a
category A disease in kept animals if the disease
is present in that establishment, or to rule it out if
not present (Art. 6 (2))
• Event of suspicion of HPAI outbreak
• in an establishment
• kept animals of listed species
• the listed species for HPAI as provided in Commission Implemented
Regulation 2018/1882 are species of the Class Aves
• the competent authority shall immediately conduct an investigation to
confirm or rule out the presence of the suspected listed disease
• official veterinarians perform clinical examinations and collect samples
for laboratory examinations








2nd Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures, based on laboratory
examination (ToR 1.2), in their ability to detect
the disease in the event of preventive killing, and
in their ability to support with the epidemiological
investigation (disease detection, prevalence
estimation, virus identification, etc.) in kept
animals of listed species in an affected
establishment, before or when they are killed or
found dead. The purposes of the epidemiological
enquiry are described in Article 57 of Regulation
(EU)2016/429
• affected establishment officially confirmed
• kept animals of listed species found dead or before/when they are
killed
• competent authority collects samples for laboratory examinationfor the
purposes of:
a) supporting the epidemiological enquiry:
– to identify the likely origin of the disease
– to calculate the likely length of time that the disease is present
– to identify establishments where the animals could have
contracted the disease and movements from the affected
establishment that could have led to the spread of the disease
– to obtain information on the likely spread of the listed disease
in the surrounding environment, including the presence and
distribution of disease vectors
b) confirming/ruling out disease in the event of preventive killing
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3rd Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical (ToR 1.1)
and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the
animals of listed species belonging to the
categories described in article 13(2)) of an
affected establishment, in order to grant a specific
derogation from killing these animals, while
ensuring that they do not pose a risk for the
transmission of the disease
• affected establishment officially confirmed
• kept animals of listed species of specific categories
• animal categories based on article 13(2):
(a) animals kept in a confined establishment
(b) animals kept for scientific purposes or purposes related to
conservation of protected or endangered species
(c) animals officially registered in advance as rare breeds
(d) animals with a duly justified high genetic, cultural or educational
value
• the competent authority may grant specific derogation from killing all
the animals of listed species belonging to any of the above categories
in an affected establishment, provided that specific conditions are
fulfilled
• the animals should be subjected to clinical surveillance, including
laboratory examinations
• vsampling procedures should ensure that the animals do not pose a









4th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures, based on clinical (ToR 1.1)
and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the
animals of non-listed species kept in an affected
establishment, in their ability to ensure the
detection of the virus if the virus is present in
these species
• kept animals of non-listed species of epidemiological relevance for the
control of the disease
• animals of non-listed species are those animals that are not listed in
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1882 for each of the
category A diseases
• animal species acting purely as mechanical carriers of the virus will not
be covered
• The competent authority is not obliged to carry out the sampling of
non-listed species, but they may establish it in addition to other
measures









5th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures, based on clinical (ToR 1.1)
and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the wild
animals of listed species within the affected
establishment and in its surroundings. The
purpose of the sampling procedures is to ensure
the detection of the virus, if the virus is present in
these wild species
• affected establishment officially confirmed
• wild animals of listed species within the establishment and in the
surroundings of the establishment
• the competent authority may establish these sampling procedures in
addition to other measures
• sampling procedures in wild animals of listed species to ensure the
detection of the virus, if the virus is present in these wild species
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6th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical (ToR 1.1)
and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the
animals of listed species in establishments located
in the protection zone. The purpose of the
sampling procedures is to ensure the detection of
the virus, if the virus is present in these animals
• protection zone with radius up to 3 km
• non-affected establishments with kept animals of listed species
• all the non-affected establishments within the protection zone
• official veterinarians must visit at least once all the establishments
• among others, they must perform a clinical examination of kept
animals of listed species and if necessary, collection of samples for
laboratory examination
• sampling procedures to confirm or rule out the presence of a category
A disease






7th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures, based on clinical (ToR 1.1)
and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the
animals of listed species, for the sampling of
establishments located in a protection zone when
the radius is larger than 3 km. The purpose of the
sampling procedure is to ensure disease detection
of the virus if the virus is present in
establishments within the protection zone
• protection zone with radius larger than 3 km
• non-affected establishments of kept animals of listed species
• sample of the non-affected establishments in the protection zone
• in a protection zone with a radius equal to 3 km, official veterinarians
must carry inspections in all establishments within the 3 km
• In case of a radius larger than 3 km, official veterinarians may not visit
all establishments, but a sample of those. EFSA is requested to assess
how many of these establishments should be inspected, in order to
ensure the detection of the virus, if the virus is present in animals in
these establishments
• among others perform clinical examination of kept animals of listed
species and if necessary, collection of samples for laboratory
examination
• sampling procedure to ensure the detection of the disease if the
disease is present in any of these establishments
ToR 1.3 Article 41 of
the Delegated
Regulation
8th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures, based on clinical (ToR 1.1)
and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the
animals of listed species, for the sampling of the
establishments located within the surveillance
zone. The purpose of the sampling procedure is
to ensure disease detection if the virus is present
in establishments within the surveillance zone
• surveillance zone
• establishments of kept animals of listed species
• sample of the establishments in the surveillance zone
• official veterinarians carry out visits to a sample of the establishments
• among others perform clinical examination of kept animals of listed
species and if necessary, collection of samples for laboratory
examination
• sampling procedure to ensure the detection of the disease if the
disease is present in any of the establishments
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ToR Legislation Scenario Description of the Scenario Elements of the Scenario
Derogations to allow animal movements







9th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations of the animals of an
establishment in a protection zone, in order to
grant a derogation from prohibitions in the
movement of animals, and allow for the animals
to be moved to a slaughterhouse located within
the protection zone or in the surveillance zone or
outside the restricted zone (Art29)
• protection zone
• kept animals of listed species
• grant derogation for movement from a non-affected establishment in
the protection zone
• be moved to a slaughterhouse located within the protection zone or in
the surveillance zone or outside the restricted zone
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the
establishment, including those animals to be moved






10th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations, to grant a derogation
from prohibitions in the movement of day-old-
chicks located in the protection zone and hatched
from eggs originating in the restricted zone or
outside the restricted zone. The sampling
procedures should ensure that the movement of
these day-old-chicks to an establishment located
in the same Member State but if possible, outside
the restricted zone
• protection zone
• vgrant derogation for movement from a non-affected establishment in
the protection zone
• day-old-chicks from non-affected establishment located in the
protection zone, hatched from eggs originating in or outside the
restricted zone
• to be moved to an establishment located in the same Member State
but if possible, outside the restricted zone
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the
establishment, including those animals to be moved






11th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations, to grant a derogation
from prohibitions in the movement of ready-to-lay
poultry located in the protection zone to
establishments located in the same MS and if
possible within the restricted zone
• protection zone
• ready-to-lay poultry
• grant derogation for movement from a non-affected establishment in
the protection zone
• to be moved to an establishment located in the same Member State
and if possible, within the restricted zone
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the
establishment, including those animals to be moved
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12th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations of the animals of an
establishment in a protection zone, in order to
grant derogation from prohibitions in the
movement of these animals to a plant approved
for processing or disposal of animal by-products
in which the kept animals are immediately killed
(Art37)
• protection zone
• kept animals of listed species
• grant derogation for movement from a non-affected establishment in
the protection zone
• to be moved to a plant approved for processing or disposal of animal
by-products in which the kept animals are immediately killed
• clinical examinations and laboratory examinations of animals kept in
the establishment, including those animals to be moved





13th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations of the animals of listed
species in order to grant derogation from
prohibitions and allow for these animals to be
moved : a) from an establishment in a
surveillance zone to a slaughterhouse located
within or outside the restricted zone, b)from an
establishment outside the surveillance zone to a
slaughterhouse situated in the surveillance zone
• surveillance zone
• kept animals of listed species
• grant derogation for movement from an establishment in the
surveillance zone to be moved to a slaughterhouse within the
restricted zone or outside the restricted zone
• grant derogation for movement from an establishment outside the
surveillance zone to a slaughterhouse situated in the surveillance zone
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the
establishment, including those animals to be moved






14th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations of kept ungulates of
listed species in order to grant a derogation and
allow for the animals to be moved from an
establishment in the surveillance zone to pastures
situated within the surveillance zone
• surveillance zone
• kept ungulates of listed species
• grant derogation for movement from an establishment in the
surveillance zone
• to be moved to pastures situated within the surveillance zone
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the
establishment, including those animals to be moved






15th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations of kept ungulates of
listed species in order to grant derogation and
allow to be moved from an establishment in the
surveillance zone to an establishment belonging
to the same supply chain, located in or outside
the surveillance zone, in order to complete the
production cycle before slaughter
• surveillance zone
• kept animals of listed species
• grant derogation for movement from the surveillance zone
• to be moved to an establishment belonging to the same supply chain,
located in or outside the surveillance zone, to complete the production
cycle before slaughter
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the
establishment, including those animals to be moved
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16th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations to grant derogation of
movements of day-old-chicks hatched from
establishment located in the surveillance zone,
from eggs originating within the surveillance zone
and eggs originating outside the restricted zone,
to an establishment located in the same Member
State where they were hatched
• surveillance zone
• kept birds of listed species
• grant derogation for movement of day-old-chicks hatched from
establishment located in the surveillance zone, from eggs originating
from establishment within the surveillance zone or eggs originating
from outside the restricted zone
• to be moved to an establishment located in the same Member State
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the
establishment, including those animals to be moved






17th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations, to grant a derogation
from prohibitions in the movement of ready-to-lay
poultry located in the surveillance zone to
establishments located in the same MS
• surveillance zone
• ready-to-lay poultry
• to be moved to an establishment located in the same Member State
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the
establishment, including those animals to be moved




18th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on clinical and/or
laboratory examinations of the animals of an
establishment located in the restricted zone of an
outbreak in order to allow their move within the
restricted zone, when restriction measures are
maintained beyond the period set out in Annex XI
• restricted zone when restriction measures are maintained beyond the
period set out in Annex XI
• kept animals of listed species
• grant derogation for movement from an establishment within the
restricted zone
• clinical examinations and laboratory examination of animals kept in the
establishment, including those animals to be moved
Repopulation




19th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on laboratory
examinations of the animals that are kept for the
repopulation prior to their introduction to rule out
the presence of the disease
• repopulation of a previous affected establishment
• kept animals of listed species
• Animals intended to repopulation shall be sampled prior to their
introduction into the establishment of destination
• samples shall be collected from a representative number of animals to
be introduced of each consignment from each establishment or from a
representative number of animals of each consignment (if animals are
all to be introduced at different times or from different establishments
of origin)
• laboratory examinations
• sampling procedures to rule out the presence of the disease
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 59 EFSA Journal 2021;19(1):6372
Control measures of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
ToR Legislation Scenario Description of the Scenario Elements of the Scenario




20th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on laboratory
examinations of the animals that have been
repopulated, in the event of unusual mortalities or
clinical signs being notified during the
repopulation; to rule out the presence of the
disease
• repopulated establishment
• unusual mortalities or clinical signs during the repopulation
• the official veterinarians shall without delay collect samples for
laboratory examination
• sampling procedures to rule out the presence of the disease




21st Scenario To assess the effectiveness of disease-specific
sampling procedures based on laboratory
examinations of the animals that have been
repopulated, on the last day of the monitoring
period calculated forward from the date on which
the animals were placed in the repopulated
establishment. In case the repopulation takes
place in several days, the monitoring period will
be calculated forward from the last day in which
the last animal is introduced in the establishment
• repopulated establishment
• kept animals of listed species
• Animals that have been used for repopulation
• Laboratory examinations
• Sampling procedures to rule out the presence of the disease
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Annex C – Sampling procedures for HPAI
Scenario Description of the Scenario
Clinical guidelines based on
Commission Decision (2006/437/EC)
in accordance with Article 7 of
Directive 2005/94/EC
Laboratory guidelines based on Commission Decision
(2006/437/EC) in accordance with Article 7 of Directive
2005/94/EC
1st To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures of animals of
listed species in a suspected establishment,
based on clinical examination (TOR 1.1) and
laboratory examination (TOR 1.2), in their
ability to detect a category A disease in
kept animals if the disease is present in that
establishment, or to rule it out if not
present (Art. 6 (2))
Commission Decision (2006/437/EC)
approving a Diagnostic manual for avian
influenza (hereinafter called ‘Diagnostic
manual’) in accordance with Article 7 of
Directive 2005/94/EC, requires the:
– inspection of production and health
records (daily mortality, egg-production
and feed-and/or water intake) from
one week before the commencement
of clinical signs,
– clinical inspection in each production
unit: evaluation of clinical history and
clinical examination of poultry or other
captive birds, in particular those that
appear sick,
– if competent authority is not satisfied
with clinical inspection, standard
samples must be taken,
– final clinical inspection of the poultry
independent of the results of the
laboratory examination prior to the
lifting of the official surveillance
Standard samples to be taken:
For virological testing:
o at least 5 sick/dead birds and/or
o at least 20 tracheal/oropharyngeal and 20 cloacal swabs (or
from all birds if a small number of birds present)
Birds showing clinical signs must be targeted
For serological testing:
o at least 20 blood samples (or from all birds if small number
of birds present).
Birds appearing sick or that have apparently recovered must be
targeted
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 61 EFSA Journal 2021;19(1):6372
Control measures of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
Scenario Description of the Scenario
Clinical guidelines based on
Commission Decision (2006/437/EC)
in accordance with Article 7 of
Directive 2005/94/EC
Laboratory guidelines based on Commission Decision
(2006/437/EC) in accordance with Article 7 of Directive
2005/94/EC
2nd To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures, based on
laboratory examination (ToR 1.2), in their
ability to detect the disease in the event of
preventive killing, and in their ability to
support with the epidemiological
investigation (disease detection, prevalence
estimation, virus identification, etc.) in kept
animals of listed species in an affected
establishment, before or when they are
killed or found dead. The purposes of the
epidemiological enquiry are described in
Article 57 of Regulation (EU)2016/429
No specific guidelines described Standard samples must be taken from poultry and other captive
birds which are killed, in each production unit
3rd To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2)
examinations of the animals of listed
species belonging to the categories
described in article 13(2)) of an affected
establishment, in order to grant a specific
derogation from killing these animals, while
ensuring that they do not pose a risk for
the transmission of the disease
Check of the production and health records
of the holding, if such records exist.
Clinical inspection in each production unit,
including an evaluation of its clinical history
and clinical examinations of poultry or other
captive birds, in particular those that
appear sick
Samples must be taken for laboratory testing, 21 days following
the date of the last positive finding of HPAI from each production
unit and at 21 days intervals
Samples to be taken:
(i) samples of any dead poultry or other captive birds present
at the time of sampling,
(ii) where practical, tracheal/oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs
from at least 60 poultry or other captive birds or from all
such poultry or other captive birds where less than 60 are
present on the holding; or if the birds are small, exotic and
not used to being handled or handling them would be
dangerous for people, samples of fresh faeces must be
collected.
However, the competent authority may grant derogations from
the sample size referred to in (i) and (ii), based on the outcome
of a risk assessment
The sampling and laboratory testing of such samples must
continue until two consecutive negative laboratory results are
obtained which must be at least 21 days apart
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Scenario Description of the Scenario
Clinical guidelines based on
Commission Decision (2006/437/EC)
in accordance with Article 7 of
Directive 2005/94/EC
Laboratory guidelines based on Commission Decision
(2006/437/EC) in accordance with Article 7 of Directive
2005/94/EC
4th To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures, based on
clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2)
examinations of the animals of non-listed
species kept in an affected establishment,
in their ability to ensure the detection of the
virus if the virus is present in these species.
Species: PIGS and others (cats in the case
of H5N1)
A check of the production and health
records of the holding, if such records exist.
A clinical inspection in each production unit,
including an evaluation of its clinical history.
Clinical examinations of the pigs, in
particular those that appear sick
Samples to be taken:
o Nasal/oropharyngeal swabs from at least 60 pigs from
each production unit or from all pigs where less than
60 pigs are present in the production unit, must be taken
before or on the day the infected poultry or other captive
birds are culled
o At least 60 blood samples must be collected from the pigs,
2–4 weeks from the date of the cull. Samples must be
collected in such a way that at least one sample is
obtained from groups of pigs that are in direct contact with
each other
Samples to be taken before pigs can be moved out of the
establishment:
o The movement of pigs to other holdings may be
authorised if at least 60 nasal/oropharyngeal swabs and
60 blood samples from pigs, from each production unit,
14 days following the date of the positive findings of the
presence of AI have given negative results
o The movement of pigs to a slaughterhouse may be
authorised if at least 60 nasal/oropharyngeal swabs, from
each production unit, 14 days following the date of the
positive findings of the presence of AI have given negative
results
o In the case of inconclusive or positive laboratory results,
any further investigations required to exclude the infection
or transmission of AI amongst pigs
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Scenario Description of the Scenario
Clinical guidelines based on
Commission Decision (2006/437/EC)
in accordance with Article 7 of
Directive 2005/94/EC
Laboratory guidelines based on Commission Decision
(2006/437/EC) in accordance with Article 7 of Directive
2005/94/EC
Others:
Where the official veterinarian has a suspicion that other
domestic mammals on the holdings, in particular those with
identified susceptibility to infection with AI viruses of H5 and H7
subtypes, may have been in contact with the infected poultry or
other captive birds, samples for laboratory tests must be taken.
Investigations in other mammals other than pigs which are
susceptible to AI including cats must be undertaken
With specific reference to HPAI H5N1, the following must be
carried out for testing cats: gross pathological lesions, associated
with viral replication, concentrate on the lungs and liver,
therefore samples for virological investigations must preferably
be taken from these organs of dead animals. In living animals,
preferably tracheal/oropharyngeal swabs must be taken for virus
detection. In addition, faecal swabs can be taken separately
5th To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures, based on
clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2)
examinations of the wild animals of listed
species within the affected establishment
and in its surroundings. The purpose of the
sampling procedures is to ensure the
detection of the virus, if the virus is present
in these wild species
No specific guidelines described No specific guidelines described
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Scenario Description of the Scenario
Clinical guidelines based on
Commission Decision (2006/437/EC)
in accordance with Article 7 of
Directive 2005/94/EC
Laboratory guidelines based on Commission Decision
(2006/437/EC) in accordance with Article 7 of Directive
2005/94/EC
6th To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2)
examinations of the animals of listed
species in establishments located in the
protection zone. The purpose of the
sampling procedures is to ensure the
detection of the virus, if the virus is present
in these animals
a) b) c) A check of the production and
health records of the holding, if such
records exist
The daily mortality data and daily data on
feed- and/or water intake must be checked
if available, for the period beginning one
week before the date of contact with the
flock suspected of being infected with AI
until the date of the inspection of the
holding.
A clinical inspection in each production unit,
including an evaluation of its clinical history
and clinical examinations of poultry or other
captive birds, in particular those that
appear sick.
a)b)c) If there are clinical signs present in poultry or other
captive birds or indications of an increase in daily mortality (> 3
times normal mortality rate of the flock) or a depression in daily
egg production (> 5%) or a decrease in daily feed and/or water
intake (> 5%) : the standard samples must be taken immediately
from each production unit
a) If there are no signs, the standard samples must be taken
21 days following the date of the last suspected contact with an
infected holding or when the poultry or other captive birds are
killed
b) If there are no signs but the species of poultry or other
captive birds are not expected to clearly express clinical signs of
disease, or in the case of vaccinated birds, the competent
authority may decide, based on the outcome of a risk
assessment that the standard samples must be taken from each
production unit
7th To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures, based on
clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2)
examinations of the animals of listed
species, for the sampling of establishments
located in a protection zone when the
radius is larger than 3 km. The purpose of
the sampling procedure is to ensure disease
detection of the virus if the virus is present
in establishments within the protection zone
N/A (current protection zone radius is 3 km) N/A (current protection zone radius is 3 km)
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Scenario Description of the Scenario
Clinical guidelines based on
Commission Decision (2006/437/EC)
in accordance with Article 7 of
Directive 2005/94/EC
Laboratory guidelines based on Commission Decision
(2006/437/EC) in accordance with Article 7 of Directive
2005/94/EC
8th To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures, based on
clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2)
examinations of the animals of listed
species, for the sampling of the
establishments located within the
surveillance zone. The purpose of the
sampling procedure is to ensure disease
detection if the virus is present in
establishments within the surveillance zone
A check of the production and health
records of the holding
A clinical inspection in each production unit,
including an evaluation of its clinical history
Clinical examinations of poultry or other
captive birds, in particular those that
appear sick
Standard samples must be taken from each production unit
Derogations to allow animal movements
9th To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations of
the animals of an establishment in a
protection zone, in order to grant a
derogation from prohibitions in the
movement of animals, and allow for the
animals to be moved to a slaughterhouse
located within the protection zone or in the
surveillance zone or outside the restricted
zone (Art29)
A check of the production and health
records of the holding
A clinical inspection in each production unit,
including an evaluation of its clinical history
Clinical examinations of any poultry, in
particular those that appear sick less than
24 h prior to the time of departure of the
poultry
The official veterinarian shall ensure that a
detailed examination of the poultry is
carried out at the designated
slaughterhouse when the poultry arrive and
after they are slaughtered
Samples to be taken based on the outcome of a risk assessment:
at least 60 tracheal/oropharyngeal and/or 60 cloacal swabs must
be taken from poultry from each production unit to be sent to
slaughter less than 48 h prior to the time of departure of the
poultry
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Scenario Description of the Scenario
Clinical guidelines based on
Commission Decision (2006/437/EC)
in accordance with Article 7 of
Directive 2005/94/EC
Laboratory guidelines based on Commission Decision
(2006/437/EC) in accordance with Article 7 of Directive
2005/94/EC
10th To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations, to
grant a derogation from prohibitions in the
movement of day-old-chicks located in the
protection zone and hatched from eggs
originating in the restricted zone or outside
the restricted zone. The sampling
procedures should ensure that the
movement of these day-old-chicks to an
establishment located in the same Member
State but if possible, outside the restricted
zone
Current guidelines do not require any
clinical or laboratory examination of the
day-old-chicks but the holding of
destination must be placed under
surveillance (see scenario 6).
The guidelines for inspecting a parent flock
holding prior to the movement of hatching
eggs are:
a) a check of the production and health
records of the holding, and
b) a clinical inspection in each production
unit every 15 days.
Guidelines do not require any clinical or laboratory examination
of the day-old-chicks but the holding of destination must be
placed under surveillance (see scenario 6).
Standard samples must be taken from each production unit of a
parent flock holding prior to the movement of hatching eggs
11th To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations, to
grant a derogation from prohibitions in the
movement of ready-to-lay poultry located in
the protection zone, to establishments
located in the same Member State and if
possible within the restricted zone
The guidelines include:
a) check of the production and health
records of the holding,
b) a clinical inspection in each production
unit, including an evaluation of its
clinical history and,
c) clinical examinations of the poultry, in
particular those that appear sick less
than 24 h prior to the time of
departure of the poultry.
Samples to be taken based on the outcome of a risk assessment:
at least 60 tracheal/oropharyngeal and/or 60 cloacal swabs must
be taken from poultry from each production unit to be sent to
slaughter less than 48 h prior to the time of departure of the
poultry
12th To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations of
the animals of an establishment in a
protection zone, in order to grant
derogation from prohibitions in the
movement of these animals to a plant
approved for processing or disposal of
animal by-products in which the kept
animals are immediately killed (Art37)
No specific guidelines described No specific guidelines described
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Scenario Description of the Scenario
Clinical guidelines based on
Commission Decision (2006/437/EC)
in accordance with Article 7 of
Directive 2005/94/EC
Laboratory guidelines based on Commission Decision
(2006/437/EC) in accordance with Article 7 of Directive
2005/94/EC
13th To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations of
the animals of listed species in order to
grant derogation from prohibitions and
allow for these animals to be moved:
a) from an establishment in a surveillance
zone to a slaughterhouse located within or
outside the restricted zone, b) from an
establishment outside the surveillance zone
to a slaughterhouse situated in the
surveillance zone
No specific guidelines described No specific guidelines described
14th To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations of
kept ungulates of listed species in order to
grant a derogation and allow for the
animals to be moved from an establishment
in the surveillance zone to pastures situated
within the surveillance zone
N/A N/A
15th To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations of
kept ungulates of listed species in order to
grant derogation and allow for them to be
moved from an establishment in the
surveillance zone to an establishment
belonging to the same supply chain, located
in or outside the surveillance zone, in order
to complete the production cycle before
slaughter
N/A N/A
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Scenario Description of the Scenario
Clinical guidelines based on
Commission Decision (2006/437/EC)
in accordance with Article 7 of
Directive 2005/94/EC
Laboratory guidelines based on Commission Decision
(2006/437/EC) in accordance with Article 7 of Directive
2005/94/EC
16th To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations to
grant derogation of movements of day-old-
chicks hatched from establishment located
in the surveillance zone, from eggs
originating within the surveillance zone and
eggs originating outside the restricted zone,
to an establishment located in the same
Member State where they were hatched
No specific guidelines described No specific guidelines described
17th To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations, to
grant a derogation from prohibitions in the
movement of ready-to-lay poultry located in
the surveillance zone to establishments
located in the same Member State
No specific guidelines described No specific guidelines described
18th To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
clinical and/or laboratory examinations of
the animals of an establishment located in
the restricted zone of an outbreak in order
to allow their move within the restricted
zone, when restriction measures are
maintained beyond the period set out in
Annex XI
No specific guidelines described No specific guidelines described
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Scenario Description of the Scenario
Clinical guidelines based on
Commission Decision (2006/437/EC)
in accordance with Article 7 of
Directive 2005/94/EC
Laboratory guidelines based on Commission Decision
(2006/437/EC) in accordance with Article 7 of Directive
2005/94/EC
Repopulation
19th To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
laboratory examinations of the animals that
are kept for the repopulation prior to their
introduction to rule out the presence of the
disease
Only an assessment of laboratory guidelines
is requested
The diagnostic manual, Article 49(3)(b) and (c) — Re-population
of holdings, specifies that ‘if appropriate’ at least 20 blood
samples should be taken as soon as the poultry have been
placed in the holding except in the case of day-old chicks; if
appropriate such sampling may be performed on the holding of
origin of the poultry before movement to the holding for
re-population
The Delegated Regulation (Art. 59 (2), (3) and (9)),
supplementing Regulation (EU) 2016/429 estates that:
Samples shall be collected from:
o A representative number of all the animals to be introduced in
the establishment, if they are all introduced at the same time
and from the same establishment of origin; or
o A representative number of animals of each consignment, if
animals are all to be introduced at different times or from
different establishments of origin
o In the case of day-old-chicks, the competent authority may
decide not to perform the sampling for laboratory
examination
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Scenario Description of the Scenario
Clinical guidelines based on
Commission Decision (2006/437/EC)
in accordance with Article 7 of
Directive 2005/94/EC
Laboratory guidelines based on Commission Decision
(2006/437/EC) in accordance with Article 7 of Directive
2005/94/EC
20th To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
laboratory examinations of the animals that
have been repopulated, in the event of
unusual mortalities or clinical signs being
notified during the repopulation; to rule out
the presence of the disease
Only an assessment of laboratory guidelines
is requested
Samples to be taken during routine surveillance of repopulated
establishments from each production unit:
o At least 20 blood samples as soon as the poultry have
been placed in the holding except in the case of day-old
chicks; if appropriate such sampling may be performed on
the holding of origin of the poultry before movement to
the holding for re-population
o Samples of dead poultry or swabs taken from their
carcasses from a maximum of 10 dead birds per week
during the 21-day period from the date of the
re-population
o Where the holding has previously been infected with HPAI
20 tracheal/oropharyngeal and 20 cloacal swabs must also
be taken from waterfowl (ducks/geese) from each
production unit, if appropriate, within the last week of the
21-day period from the date of re-population.
onetheless, no specific sampling procedures are described
in the event of unusual mortalities or clinical signs being
notified during the repopulation
21st To assess the effectiveness of disease-
specific sampling procedures based on
laboratory examinations of the animals that
have been repopulated, on the last day of
the monitoring period calculated forward
from the date on which the animals were
placed in the repopulated establishment. In
case the repopulation takes place in several
days, the monitoring period will be
calculated forward from the last day in
which the last animal is introduced in the
establishment
Only an assessment of laboratory guidelines
is requested
Samples to be taken during routine surveillance of repopulated
establishments from each production unit:
o At least 20 blood samples as soon as the poultry have been
placed in the holding except in the case of day-old chicks; if
appropriate such sampling may be performed on the holding
of origin of the poultry before movement to the holding for
re-population
o Samples of dead poultry or swabs taken from their carcasses
from a maximum of 10 dead birds per week during the 21-day
period from the date of the re-population
o Where the holding has previously been infected with HPAI 20
tracheal/oropharyngeal and 20 cloacal swabs must also be
taken from waterfowl (ducks/geese) from each production
unit, if appropriate, within the last week of the 21-day period
from the date of re-population.
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Annex D – Scenarios of ToR 2
ToRs Legislation Scenario Description of the Scenario Elements of the Scenarios
ToR 2 Article 8 Delegated
Regulation
Article 57 of 2016/429
Regulation
Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
1st Scenario To assess the effectiveness of
the length of the Monitoring
Period, as the time period
calculated backwards from the
date of the notification of the
suspicion of a category A
disease in an establishment
with kept animals of listed
species, for the purposes of the
epidemiological enquiry in the
event of a suspicion
• event of suspicion of a category A disease
• in an establishment with kept animals of listed species
• time period calculated backwards from the date of the of the notification of the
suspicion
• time period before the suspicion, during which the pathogenic agent may have
been introduced in the establishment and may have spread outside the
establishment.
• the aim of the epidemiological enquire is:
(a) identify the likely origin of the listed disease in question and the means of
its spread
(b) calculate the likely length of time that the listed disease has been present
(c) identify establishments and epidemiological units therein, food and feed
businesses or animal by-products establishments, or other locations, where
animals of listed species for the suspected listed disease may have become
infected, infested or contaminated
(d) obtain information on the movements of kept animals, persons, products,
vehicles, any material or other means by which the disease agent could
have been spread during the relevant period preceding the notification of
the suspicion or confirmation of the listed disease
(e) obtain information on the likely spread of the listed disease in the
surrounding environment, including the presence and distribution of disease
vectors
ToR 2 Article 17(2)
Article 57 of 2016/429
Regulation, Annex II of the
Delegated Regulation,
2nd Scenario To assess the effectiveness of
the length of the Monitoring
Period, as the time period
calculated backwards from the
date of notification of the
suspicion of a category A
disease in an establishment
with kept animals of listed
species, for the purposes of the
epidemiological enquiry in the
event of confirmation of the
disease
• event of confirmation of a category A disease
• in an establishment with kept animals of listed species
• time period calculated backwards from the date of the notification of the
suspicion
• time period before the suspicion, during which the pathogenic agent was
introduced in the establishment and during which it could have spread outside
the establishment.
• The aim of the epidemiological enquire is the same as above.
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ToRs Legislation Scenario Description of the Scenario Elements of the Scenarios
ToR 2 Article 13(b) Delegated
Regulation
Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
3rd Scenario To assess the effectiveness of
the length of the Monitoring
Period, as the time period
calculated backwards from the
date of confirmation of a
category A disease in an
establishment with kept animals
of listed species, during which
the epidemiological units in
which the disease has not been
confirmed were kept completely
separated and handled by
different personnel, in order to
provide derogations from killing
• event of confirmation of a category A disease
• in an affected establishment with kept animals of listed species
• non-affected epidemiological units kept separated
• to provide derogation from killing for animals in non-affected separated
epidemiological units
• to exclude any possible contact between the affected establishment and the
separated epidemiological units as per the epidemiological enquiry
• time period calculated backwards from the date of the confirmation
• time period before the confirmation, during which the pathogenic agent may
have been introduced in the separated non-affected epidemiological units of
the affected establishment
ToR 2 Article 27(3)c Delegated
Regulation
Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
4th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of
the length of the Monitoring
Period, as the time period
calculated backwards from the
date of notification of the
suspicion of the latest outbreak
of a category A disease in the
protection zone. Products or
other materials likely to spread
the disease, must had been
obtained or produced, before
this time period in order to be




• Products or other materials likely to spread the disease, obtained or produced,
before the start of the monitoring period of the affected establishment that
originated the protection zone
• time period calculated backwards from the date of suspicion of the latest
outbreak in the protection zone
• time period before the notification of the suspicion, during which the products
and materials produced in the non-affected establishments of a protection zone
may have been contaminated by the pathogenic agent of the disease
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ToRs Legislation Scenario Description of the Scenario Elements of the Scenarios




Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
5th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of
the length of the Monitoring
Period, as the time period
calculated forwards from the
date of semen collection from
animals of listed species kept in
approved germinal product
establishments in the protection
or in the surveillance zone, to
prove that the donor animal
has tested favourable on a
sample taken not earlier than
7 days after the monitoring
period
• protection or surveillance zone
• non-affected approved germinal establishments
• semen from kept animals (donor) of listed species
• semen collected after the estimated date of the earliest infection of the earliest
affected establishment that originated the protection zone/surveillance zone (if
belonging to more than one protection or surveillance zones).
• to take samples from the donor for laboratory analysis at least 7 days after the
end of the monitoring period
• to authorise movements of semen from approved germinal product
establishments located in the protection or surveillance zones in case of
favourable laboratory results
• time period calculated forwards from the date of semen collection
• time period after the semen collection, during which the animal donor if
infected could be detected by the relevant diagnostic test
ToR 2 Article 57(1)b Delegated
Regulation
Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
6th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of
the length of the Monitoring
Period, as the appropriate time
period calculated forwards from
the date after the final cleaning
and disinfection and when
relevant control of insects and
rodents was carried out in an
affected establishment, after
which the repopulation of the
establishment may be allowed
by the competent authority
• repopulation of a previous affected establishment
• kept animals of listed species
• to allow the repopulation of an affected establishment
• time period calculated forwards from the date of the final cleaning and
disinfection of the establishment
• time period to ensure that the repopulation exercise is not put at risk due to
the disease being unknowingly present in an establishment in the surrounding
area
ToR 2 Article 59(4)b Delegated
Regulation
Annex II of the Delegated
Regulation
7th Scenario To assess the effectiveness of
the length of the Monitoring
Period, as the appropriate time
period calculated forwards the
date when the first animal was
introduced, during which all the
animals of listed species
intended for repopulation
should be introduced
• repopulation of a previous affected establishment
• kept animals of listed species to be repopulated
• the animals may not be introduced at the same time
• time period calculated forwards from the date when the first animal was
introduced
• time period during which animals intended for repopulation, should be
introduced and the process of repopulation be completed
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Annex E – Minimum radius and minimum period of duration of protection and surveillance zones according to the






















Minimum period of duration of
measures in the surveillance zone
(as referred to in Articles 55 and 56
of this Regulation)
Annex XI
Foot and mouth disease (FMD) 3 km 10 km 15 days 15 days 30 days
Infection with rinderpest virus
(RP)
3 km 10 km 21 days 9 days 30 days
Infection with Rift Valley fever
virus (RVFV)
20 km 50 km 30 days 15 days 45 days
Infection with lumpy skin disease
virus (LSD)
20 km 50 km 28 days 17 days 45 days
Infection with Mycoplasma
mycoides subsp. mycoides SC
(Contagious bovine
pleuropneumonia) (CBPP)
Establishment 3 km 45 days Not applicable 45 days
Sheep pox and goat pox (SPGP) 3 km 10 km 21 days 9 days 30 days
Infection with peste des petits
ruminant virus (PPR)
3 km 10 km 21 days 9 days 30 days
Contagious caprine
pleuropneumonia (CCPP)
Establishment 3 km 45 days Not applicable 45 days
African horse sickness (AHS) 100 km 150 km 12 months Not applicable 12 months
Infection with Burkholderia mallei
(Glanders)
Establishment Establishment 6 months Not applicable Not applicable
Classical swine fever (CSF) 3 km 10 km 15 days 15 days 30 days
African swine fever (ASF) 3 km 10 km 15 days 15 days 30 days
Highly pathogenic avian influenza
(HPAI)
3 km 10 km 21 day 9 days 30 days
Infection with Newcastle disease
virus (NCD)
3 km 10 km 21 days 9 days 30 days
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Annex F – Within-flock dynamics of HPAIV in Galliformes and Anseriformes
Figure F.1: Within-flock dynamics of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in gallinaceous poultry. The plots show the median (solid line) and 95%
prediction interval (shading) for the number of exposed birds (magenta, left column), infectious birds (red, middle column) and cumulative
number of dead birds (cyan, right column) for six scenarios (rows; see Table 2 for details)
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Figure F.2: Within-flock dynamics of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in Anseriformes. The plots show the median (solid line) and 95% prediction
interval (shading) for the number of exposed birds (magenta, first column), infectious birds (red, second column), recovered birds (blue, third
column) and cumulative number of dead birds (cyan, fourth column) for six scenarios (rows; see Table 3 for details)
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Annex G – Uncertainty
Source or location
of the uncertainty
Nature or cause of uncertainty as described by the
experts
Impact of the uncertainty on the assessment
ToR 1 Estimates of transmission parameters and infectious period
mostly originate from experimental settings. Moreover,
they are restricted to chicken and ducks
It is unclear what effect in the assessment this uncertainty would have (in the event of
transmission taking place in other species)
ToR 1 Assumptions of transmission model (homogeneous mixing,
frequency dependent transmission)
It is unclear what the effect of this uncertainty would be in the assessment
ToR 1 Sensitivity of the diagnostic tests is assumed to be 100% The effectiveness of the proposed sampling strategy may be overestimated if the tests
failed to detect correctly all infected animals
ToR 2 Information on the period elapsed between the earliest
point of infection and the suspicion report could only be
retrieved from a limited number of references that were
mostly describing outbreaks in chicken (only one paper for
ducks) and originated from only two countries in the EU
The effectiveness of the proposed monitoring period could be underestimated, in
particular for certain Anseriformes that show limited clinical manifestation
ToR 3 The kernel estimates are based on only two epidemics
(Italy and the Netherlands) and are based on H7 viruses,
not H5
It is unclear what the effect in the assessment would be. In Europe no kernels are
available based on H5 viruses. The reason is that the kernels are based on between farm
transmission and involvement of wild bird infections makes it (in the absence of WGS
data of the viruses) difficult to distinguish new introductions from between farm spread
ToR 3 Minimum period of the protection and surveillance zone:
Similar to ToR 2
Similar to ToR 2
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